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ABSTRACT 
     The African Indigenous Leafy Vegetables (AILV) agricultural sub-sector in Kenya has in 
recent times gained considerable prominence and attention. A diverse number of studies have 
underpinned the role it can play in improving the economic standing of smallholders, while 
playing an imperative nutritional role in the diets of many consumers. Stemming from 
increased awareness on the rise of various lifestyle illnesses and crusaders championing for 
healthy eating habits, the demand of AILV, as healthier dietary alternatives, has been 
gradually on the rise. However, the socioeconomic and institutional factors that influence 
market participation and the effect of choice of market packages on AILV income are still not 
clear. Therefore, the main objectives of the study were: to characterize the socio-economic 
attributes of AILV farmers; to determine factors influencing households’ market participation 
behaviour; and to identify the combination of market outlets that deliver the highest payoffs 
(income) to farmers. The study was based on data collected from a sample of 254 households 
drawn from Nyamira North Sub-County in Nyamira County. A multistage sampling 
procedure was used to arrive at the sample, with semi structured questionnaires employed as 
the research instrument to collect qualitative and quantitative data through face to face 
interviews. The determinants of market participation behaviour among smallholders was 
estimated by an ordered probit model, while the combination of market outlets that delivered 
the highest payoffs (income) to farmers employed a multinomial endogenous switching 
regression. SPSS and STATA software were used for data analysis and management. 
Findings revealed that marketing experience, land ownership, households’ food self-
sufficiency, contractual marketing, access to credit and extension services significantly 
influenced the regimes in which smallholders participated in markets. Further, using market 
packages that contained urban market outlets led to higher incomes among smallholders. It is 
not enough that farmers merely participated in markets, rather they should participate in 
markets profitably as net sellers. Identifying the specific challenges and requirements that are 
unique for each market regime (net sellers, autarkic and net buyers) through proper targeting 
and screening of farmers is necessary. Here, equipping extension workers with the ability to 
address the specific needs of each group is recommended. Urban markets, in isolation as well 
as in market packages, were clearly shown to offer higher incomes in actual and 
counterfactual scenarios. Improving the condition of roads linking urban markets to 
producers could potentially reduce transportation costs of accessing such urban markets. This 
could go on to encourage the use of urban markets among farmers, who stand to gain better 
income and gradually fish themselves out of poverty traps. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background information 
     About 30,000 edible plants are found throughout the world, 7,000 of which are grown or 
collected as food (Natarajan, 2002). According to Smith and Eyzaguirre (2007), about 3,000 
species of these plants have been commercialized with only about 20 consumed on large 
scale. African Indigenous Leafy Vegetables (AILV) are increasingly recognized as possible 
contributors of both micronutrients and bioactive compounds to the diets of populations in 
Africa. The African continent is rich of vegetable species including amaranths which are 
among the most popular leafy vegetables within the continent (Maundu et al., 2009). 
     The Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) region is a natural habitat to more than 45,000 species of 
AILV of which, about 1,000 can be eaten as green leafy or fruit vegetables that happen to be 
the mainstay of traditional diets (Mac-Calla, 1994). AILV subsequently play a significant role 
in the food security of the underprivileged in both urban and rural settings (Schippers, 2000; 
Onyango, 2002a). In Kenya, about 200 indigenous plant species are used as leafy vegetables 
(Maundu et al., 1999); of these 200, only a few have been fully domesticated, more are semi-
domesticated and majorities are collected from the wild. A study by Maundu et al. (1999) 
reported that the most consumed traditional leafy vegetables in Kenya include the 
Amaranthus species (pig weed), Vigna unguiculata (cowpea leaves), Solanum nigrum (Black 
nightshade), Cleome gynandra (spider plant) and Cucurbita species (pumpkin leaves). 
     Agriculture remains a key sector for the Kenyan economy. Its commercialization therefore 
necessitates improving participation of smallholders in markets, translating to improved 
smallholder incomes, their overall welfare, as well as their livelihoods. Hence, promoting 
smallholder commercialization through AILV production can be one avenue of such efforts. 
Here, the main argument for smallholder commercialization through AILV production is that 
it can allow households to increase their income directly (Okello et al., 2012). 
     According to the 2010-2012 Kenya Horticultural Crop Performance (KHCP) report 
compiled by the Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) for the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the 
preference and hence demand for AILV has been steadily on the rise due to increased 
awareness, among the masses, on their health and nutritional benefits. The KHCP report 
labelled the share of AILV on the domestic value for vegetables as 5% in 2012, although the 
quantity produced was 11% of all the vegetables produced during the same year. 
2 
 
     Although large-scale growers dominate commercial horticulture in Kenya, the majority of 
horticultural growers (about 80%) are small-scale farmers. Virtually all rural households 
located in arable areas grow fruits and vegetables for home consumption and sale 
(Agricultural Development Fund, 2012). This is because horticulture has higher returns than 
most cash crops and is suitable for production on small and marginal farms in varying 
climatic conditions (Minot and Ngigi, 2003). Like most other agricultural subsectors, 
producing AILV lies majorly in the hands of smallholders thus providing tremendous 
opportunities for households to participate in AILV marketing and increase rural incomes. 
Maundu (2013) reported that demand has increased significantly since Kenyan supermarkets 
started stocking AILV like nightshade. With supermarkets like Uchumi shelving AILV in 
Kenya and Uganda, it was just a matter of time before Nakumatt and other major chains took 
it up, he adds. 
     Socio-economic surveys in various parts of Africa, especially the SSA, have revealed that 
indigenous fruits and vegetables provide employment opportunities and generate income for 
the rural population (Abukutsa-Onyango, 2011). As much as consumers have become 
increasingly aware of the nutritional and medicinal value of AILV, hence rise in demand 
especially in major urban centres, the supply of these vegetables has however not matched 
growing demand. Most farmers are semi-commercially oriented poor farmers, are not 
organized, and lack inputs and skills to enable them to satisfy the dynamic market 
requirements (Ngugi and Nyoro, 2011). Further, introduction of exotic vegetables in 
mainstream agriculture have seen these vegetables only used during famine and by the poor. 
AILV are especially important to women who are involved in all aspects of the supply chain 
and dominate both intermediary and retail activities; thus providing them with an important 
income generating opportunity (Weinberger et al., 2011). The AILV market promises to keep 
growing, and with the rapidly expanding population of Kenya, a consequential increase in 
demand is projected to take place. 
     Studies by Barrett (2009) and Kirsten (2010) alluded to market access as one of the critical 
factors influencing the performance of smallholder agriculture in developing countries. 
Access to new and better-paying markets for agricultural products is thus vital in enhancing 
and diversifying the livelihoods of poor subsistence or semi-subsistence farmers (Barrett, 
2009). Such markets can be local (including village markets), catering for the local 
populations, regional markets that serve regional consumers in counties within the country or 
export markets. 
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     However, most smallholder farmers are engaged in subsistence and semi-subsistence 
agriculture with low productivity, low marketable surplus (hence low returns) and low 
investment, a situation described as low equilibrium poverty trap by Barrett and Swallow 
(2006). Enhancing returns from agricultural production through improved access to markets 
can therefore be a vital element of poverty alleviation strategies and livelihood improvement. 
Improved market access results in commercialization of agriculture, which can result in the 
production of marketable surplus and hence gains in income from agriculture meaning higher 
revenues, as well as savings translating to investment in productivity enhancing technologies. 
     Making reference to Omamo (1998), Fafchamps and Hill (2005) and Shiferaw et al. 
(2009), despite the importance of market access in many developing country settings, it 
remains severely constrained by poor access to agricultural/market information. Poor access 
to market information results to information-related problems, such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection, which increase transaction costs, discouraging market participation by 
some farmers. In Nyamira County, African nightshade, spider plant and giant pig weed, in 
that order, are the best performing AILV. African nightshade is popular in Kisii and Nyamira 
counties with 53% of the 22,7991 metric tonnes (MT) marketed nationwide coming from the 
two counties. 
     Nyamira County marketed 850.75 MT of leaf amaranth with a value of Ksh. 12.87 
million. It was also the leading County in the production of the giant pig weed with 81% of 
Kenya’s total of 3,068 MT valued at Ksh. 201 million. The production of giant pig weed in 
Nyamira County stood at 2,500 MT with a marketed value of Ksh. 162.50 million. The 
figures for African nightshade stood at 5,781 MT valued at Ksh. 256.08 million; cowpeas at 
1,732.26 MT valued at Ksh. 40.12 million; 88.50 MT of pumpkin leaves valued at Ksh 1.44 
million; 4,526 MT of spider plant valued at Ksh. 200.51 million and pumpkin leaves stood at 
88 MT worth 2.27 million. A quick summation of these figures reveals a market value of 
close to Ksh. 675.89 million highlighting the important contribution AILV play in the County 
and the potential they can have in poverty alleviation among poor households (USAID and 
HCDA, 2012). These figures are explicit that large volumes of AILV are marketed in the 
County depicting substantial market participation. 
     According to Bellemare and Barrett (2006), agricultural households are both consumption 
and production units. This implies that they can be net buyers of given commodities, autarkic 
with respect to them or net sellers of them. However households’ behaviour and their extent 
towards market participation is not sufficiently captured in literature, with no recent studies 
attempting to capture market dynamics of households as either net buyers, autarkic or net 
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sellers. A study by Jaleta and Gebremedhin (2011) stressed that, the extent in which the 
participation position in one market affects the other is not well explored in the literature. 
     The answer to smallholders’ market participation by categories, as either autarkic, net 
sellers or buyers, traces its origins to Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Given a household’s 
desire for a diverse consumption bundle, it can either undertake production of all such goods 
and services for auto consumption, or it can specialize in production of goods in which it is 
relatively skilled and holds comparative advantage in production. Thus, it can consume some 
portion of the good it holds comparative advantage in and trade the surplus for other goods 
and services it desires but for which it holds no comparative advantage (Barrett, 2007). 
     According to Bellemare and Barrett (2006), studies that have researched on market 
participation exist, yet the literature on the subject remains thin, especially in developing 
country settings where significant fractions make this question most salient. Different studies 
have researched on market participation decisions (Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000; Makhura 
2001; Holloway et al., 2005; Bellemare and Barrett, 2006; Gebremedhin and Hoekstra, 2007; 
Barrett, 2006; Jaleta and Gardebroek (2008). However, according to Bellemare and Barrett 
(2006), the question of whether households make marketing decisions either sequentially or 
simultaneously is not explicit, in the sense that it raises two implicit questions: “First, does 
the household decide whether to be a net buyer, autarkic, or a net seller, and then decide how 
much to buy or sell only once it gets to the market and discovers additional market 
information, conditional on having chosen not to be autarkic?; or second, does the household 
head make both decisions before leaving for the market?” 
     A study by Renkow et al. (2004) agreed that literature on smallholder market participation 
fail to capture the net position of smallholders in these markets arguing that households could 
participate in a given market both as a seller and buyer of a specific commodity at different 
times in the same production year. The decision to participate in markets or remain autarkic 
has been postulated to be household-specific rather than commodity-specific (De Janvry et 
al., 1991). Thus, separating the households’ decision into a discrete component (whether to 
participate in markets) and a continuous component (how much to sell or buy, or marketed 
surplus) for two types of market actors (buyers and sellers) provides further understanding of 
the underlying factors that govern these processes (Goetz, 1992). 
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1.2 Statement of the problem 
     Farmers in Nyamira have ventured into production of AILV due to the high market value 
associated with it. This is attributable to growing consumer awareness of their nutritional and 
health benefits. Though farmers engage in the markets, it is unclear why their overall 
participation as net sellers remains low. It also remains unknown why farmers operating 
under homogenous conditions, exhibit different market behaviours. Besides empirical 
literature on market channel choices being thin, little is known on the determinants and 
effects of using different market outlets in combinations, as opposed to individual channels. 
This study therefore aimed to fill the existing knowledge gap by giving empirical evidence on 
the determinants of market participation behaviour and outlet choices among smallholders. 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
     The general objective of this study was to evaluate the marketing behaviour of AILV 
among smallholder farmers in Nyamira County, Kenya. 
The specific objectives of the study were to: 
1. Characterize the socioeconomic and institutional attributes of smallholder AILV 
farmers. 
2. Determine the socioeconomic and institutional factors influencing the marketing 
behaviour of AILV among smallholder farmers. 
3. Determine the combination of market outlets that deliver the highest payoffs to 
smallholder AILV farmers. 
1.4 Research questions 
1. What are the socioeconomic and institutional attributes of smallholder AILV farmers? 
2. What are the socioeconomic and institutional factors influencing the marketing 
behaviour of AILV among smallholder farmers? 
3. What combination of market outlets deliver the highest payoffs to farmers? 
1.5 Justification of the study 
     Smallholder farming is ineludibly potent in various ways, in different countries and for 
different types of economic activities (Quan, 2011). AILV have both subsistence and 
commercial value (income generation) for the smallholder poor, without requiring huge 
capital investments (DFID and R4D, 2010). Therefore, encouraging smallholder farmers to 
participate in the marketing of AILV to meet available potential and opportunities, by 
creating conducive market environment for their produce, can be considered as one possible 
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avenue of improving the welfare and livelihoods of smallholder households. This is possible 
if studies like this support policy interventions by identifying factors influencing farmers’ 
participation decisions in marketing of AILV. Existing demand patterns can also be identified 
which farmers can take advantage of and profit from. As well as enriching literature on 
market participation, this study can also serve as an input for policy makers and researchers 
who wish to work in this area. 
1.6 Scope and limitations of the study 
     The study was confined to Nyamira County with the scope covering smallholder AILV 
farmers. The study was conducted in the months of April and May, 2015. Included variables 
on socio-economic, institutional and marketing factors were only selected variables and do 
not necessarily mean that all variables were captured. The market participation decisions in 
AILV were assumed to be separable in terms of autarchies, net sellers and net buyers’ 
positions. The study did not however seek to determine the extent of market participation 
amongst smallholders in terms of net sales and net purchases. 
1.7 Operational definition of terms 
     A priori: Not supported by a factual study. Proceeds from theoretical deduction rather 
than from empirical observation or experience. 
     Autarky: Economic independence or self-sufficiency. Here a household is not affected by 
outside influences and relies entirely on its resources. For this study, self-sufficient 
households are those who sell the same amount of AILV as they buy on the markets, either in 
terms of weight or value. 
     Ex-ante: Before an event (before-hand). Based on anticipated changes or activity in an 
economy. In models where there is uncertainty resolved during the course of events, the ex-
ante values are those that are calculated in advance of the resolution of uncertainty. 
     Market Packages: Combinations of market outlets. 
     Net seller: A household which is a net-seller of AILV sells more of it on the market either 
in weight or in value (quantity times price), than what they buy on the market for a given 
season or a year. 
     Net buyer: A household that is a net-buyer of AILV buys more of it (either in weight or 
value) on the market than they sell for a given season or a year. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Current status and importance of AILV 
     AILV are vegetables indigenous to Africa whose leaves, shoots and flowers are consumed 
(Schippers, 2000); and have for a long time been described by early writers, researchers and 
scholars as weeds (FAO, 1988). In Kenya and other parts of East Africa, they have been used 
by rural and urban communities (Chweya and Eyzaguire, 2000); and include several botanic 
families like amaranthaceae, bacellaceae, brassicacea, capparaceae, cucurbitaceae and 
tiliaceae (Schippers, 2000). In recent years, AILV have grown in prominence as regards to 
nutritional and economic benefits. This can be attributed to increased awareness on their 
importance as valuable sources of food, medicine and income for small-scale farmers 
(Maundu et al., 1999; Ouma, 2004). Vegetables rank higher in production than all other crops 
and they are known to provide 80% of vitamin A in diets (Bosland and Votava, 2000); while 
they play a very important role in income generation and subsistence (Schippers, 2000). 
     Although these vegetables have been neglected for a long time, their value and importance 
cannot be overemphasized. Most have advantages that include high nutritive value, 
particularly the micronutrients and to some extent the proteins (Chweya, 1997). According to 
Abukutsa-Onyango (2010), AILV are outstanding sources of micronutrients in the world and 
this makes them helpful in alleviating micronutrient deficiencies common in Sub Saharan 
Africa (SSA). Their role in food security and nutrition are yet to be fully exploited though. In 
tropical Africa where the daily diet is dominated by starchy staples, AILV are the cheapest 
and most readily available sources of important proteins, vitamins - especially the pro vitamin 
A - and essential amino acids (Martin and Meitner, 1998). Therefore, they provide vital food 
security for many subsistence farmers and consumers. 
     Over two billion people are at risk of vitamin A deficiency globally. In Kenya, levels of 
micronutrient malnutrition are high with 76% of pre-schoolers manifesting vitamin A 
deficiency. Leafy vegetables represent quality nutrition for large segments of the population 
because they supply most of the required vitamins, essential minerals and fibre (Musembi et 
al., 2013). A large number of AILV have long been known and reported to have health 
protecting properties and uses (Okeno et al., 2003); several of which continue to be used for 
prophylactic and therapeutic purposes (Dalziel, 1937). This indigenous knowledge of the 
health promoting and protecting attributes of AILV is clearly linked to their nutritional and 
non-nutrient bioactive properties. Amaranthus for example is reported to be grown for its 
8 
 
leaves which are rich in beta-carotene, calcium, iron and vitamin C (James et al., 2010). 
Among the micronutrients that these vegetables have include Vitamin A, calcium, 
manganese, magnesium and iron (Keding et al., 2009). 
     According to Abukutsa et al. (2006) and Mwai et al. (2005), AILV possess several 
agronomic advantages. Unlike the exotic vegetables, they can seed under tropical conditions, 
have short growth periods and can withstand abiotic and biotic stresses. Aside from their 
potential for income generation and self-employment, they are also well suited to 
environment-friendly farming systems like intercropping and organic farming (Chweya and 
Eyzaguire, 1999). Research indicates that AILV have a high nutritive value, are often grown 
as intercrops and are less demanding in management since their short growing periods readily 
lends them favourably to nutrition intervention programs (Onyango, 2003). 
     There is growing need among farmers in Kenya to diversify agricultural production, 
especially vegetable production (Mbugua et al., 2005). In this case, a shift from over-reliance 
on exotic vegetables and growing more AILV that include both indigenous and traditional 
vegetables will suffice. Some of the major problems that hinder optimal production and 
utilization of these vegetables include poor quality seed and documentation of the priority 
species in the region (Maundu et al., 1999). Studies by Maeda and Salunkhe (1981), Imungi 
and Potter (1983) and Belitz (1987) reported heavy losses of vitamin C and beta-carotene 
during storage of AILV. All these problems need rapid, urgent and mitigating interventions in 
order to unlock the direct economic and the traverse nutritional promise held by AILV. 
     Before 2000, AILV were found in the back-streets and a few open-air markets. However, 
AILV are now a common occurrence in most supermarkets, where they are increasing sold. 
Nairobi and its peri-urban areas are strewn with grocery shops in the main shopping areas, as 
well as retail kiosks that stock various types of AILV. The study by Schippers (2000) made 
reference to the importance of AILV to poor households, since their prices are relatively 
affordable compared to other food items. They also provide very important sources of 
employment for those outside the formal sector in peri-urban areas because of their generally 
short, labour-unintensive production systems, low levels of investment and high yield. 
Amaranthus is one of the vegetables for which consumption has greatly increased in the city 
of Nairobi (Mwangi and Kimathi, 2006). Like other AILV, it used to be sold only in informal 
markets but it is now commonly sold in supermarkets and greengrocers. However, once 
harvested, the vegetable has a very short shelf life.  
9 
 
2.2 Determinants of smallholders market participation behaviour 
     Muricho et al. (2015) explained that, in the contemporary period beginning early 1990s, 
literature on agricultural commercialization (output market participation in particular) has 
been growing rapidly. Despite the opportunities presented by liberalized markets, concerns 
on the limited market participation by smallholder farmers necessitated the need for such 
studies. According to Barrett (2008), studies on market participation were motivated by the 
need of smallholders to participate in markets and/or respond to market signals, otherwise 
market based development strategies were bound to fail in facilitating wealth creation and 
poverty reduction. De Janvry et al. (1991) and Fafchamps (1992) are credited with most of 
the theoretical foundations of agricultural market participation. Despite separately developing 
formal household models to explain smallholder supply response in the presence of market 
failures, this was not without empirical analysis challenges. Smallholder market participation 
analyses had to deal with selection bias that had been addressed using Heckman (1979) 
approach. 
     Goetz (1992) used a probit model of households’ discrete decision to participate in the 
market (either as buyers or sellers, without distinction) followed by a second-stage switching 
regression model of the continuous extent of market participation decision (transaction 
volume) to correct for the bias caused by unobserved variables. Burke (2009) explained that, 
the downside of the study by Goetz (1992) is looking only at the influence of fixed 
transaction costs on households’ decision to enter the market while not observing for the role 
of transaction costs in influencing the quantity transacted. Nevertheless it does show that 
information is a significant driver of market participation decisions. 
     On the other hand, using a nationally representative household level data collected from 
maize (corn) farmers in Mexico, Key et al. (2000) advanced on the conceptual framework of 
Goetz (1992) by identifying the role of transaction costs (fixed and proportional) on market 
participation. They used an endogenously switching regression that automatically switched 
households into three different market participation regimes, that is, market participation as 
sellers, buyers and autarkic. Their focus is not on marketing behaviour but on production 
behaviour, given the heterogeneity in market participation. Their findings show that both 
proportional and fixed transaction costs matter in market entry and output decisions. 
     Bellamere and Barrett (2006) later on developed a two stage econometric method to test 
whether rural households in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia make livestock market 
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participation decision and volume to sale decision simultaneously or sequentially using 
ordered probit and ordered tobit models. In the first discrete decision making stage where 
ordered probit model was used, households were put into three categories (net buyers, 
autarkic and net sellers). In the second stage, determinants of how much to sell or buy 
conditional on having decided to participate in the market was analyzed using the tobit 
framework which the authors called “ordered tobit model” due to the analytical approach 
used in the first stage. Bellemare and Barrett (2006) concluded that articles on household 
market participation behaviour in developing countries begin from fundamentally different 
assumptions on the nature of households’ market participation choices. 
     A study by Heltberg and Tarp (2002) found evidence that ownership of a means of 
transport and proximity to a railway increases both the likelihood of entering the market as a 
seller and the quantity sold. The break-down of the marginal effect into the entry/exit and 
quantity components shows that the first effect is substantially larger. This implies that 
promotion of market access can solicit a greater volume of additional supply from peasants 
entering the market for the first time than for existing participants. Burke (2009) explained 
that the study suffers from two inadequacies. Using cross-sectional data, identification of any 
price effect which limits their ability to compare the effectiveness of price versus non-price 
factors in increasing market participation and sales is not possible. Second, the proxy used for 
fixed transaction costs as population density and information dummy are not statistically 
significant casting doubts on the model identification. 
     Using a selectivity model and applying a two stage decision making process as done by 
Bellamere and Barrett (2006), Alene et al. (2008) analyzed the role of transaction costs on 
market participation. They expanded the scope of study to include market participation in 
both output and input using the maize sub-sector in Kenya. Similarly, on investigating the 
impact of transaction costs on smallholder agricultural commercialization, Omiti et al. (2009) 
studied factors that influenced market participation intensity in rural and peri-urban areas in 
Kenya by applying a truncated regression that excluded non-market participants (the lower 
bound of the truncation). Mathenge et al. (2010) used household level panel data to analyze 
factors influencing market participation and its impacts on income and poverty among poor 
and marginalized households in Kenya. Using the Double Hurdle model developed by Craigg 
(1971), Mathenge et al. (2010) analyzed household’s binary decision to participate in the 
market and the continuous decision on how much to sell conditional on having decided to 
participate in the market. Similarly, Mather et al. (2011) analyzed the determinants of maize 
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market participation in selected eastern and southern Africa countries by fitting a double 
hurdle model on panel data in in a random effects framework. Recently, Macharia et al. 
(2014) used the censored tobit model to analyze the impact of transaction costs on maize 
market participation in Kenya. 
     The analytical methodologies adopted in past empirical literature are varied. Majority of 
the studies used two step selectivity models to analyze the discrete decision of market 
participation, and the continuous decision of market participation (intensity), conditional on 
having made the decision to participate (Goetz, 1992; Alene et al., 2008; Mathenge et al., 
2011). The distinctive focus of these studies is their emphasis on the marketed surplus as 
opposed to the actual supply. Their intention was to analyze marketing behaviour by 
estimating the determinants of the quantities bought and/or sold while controlling for the 
endogenous selection into the respective market participation regime. A key development in 
market participation by Holloway et al. (2005) used a Bayesian double hurdle model to study 
market participation by distinguishing on non-negligible fixed costs leading to non-zero 
censoring, as in Key et al. (2000), and on the discrete participation decision and the 
continuous volume marketed decision, as in Goetz (1992). Other studies however focus on 
just analyzing the continuous decision of market participation intensity (Omiti et al., 2009; 
Macharia et al., 2014). Muricho et al. (2015) acknowledged that smallholder producers will 
not benefit by just the mere fact that they are “participating in the market”, but instead, they 
should participate profitably as net sellers. 
     Empirical literature on market participation in Africa continued throughout the first 
decade of the 21st century. This could have been driven by the continued dismal participation 
of smallholder farmers in markets even after liberalization (Muricho et al., 2015). Jagwe 
(2010) used a two-stage Heckman model and revealed that belonging to farmer groups, 
household size, ownership of transport means and distance to markets meaningfully 
influenced the extent of farmers’ participation in banana markets. Similar findings were 
reported by Shepherd (2007), suggesting that collective action through farmer groups 
increases market participation. Njuki et al. (2009) asserted that although the formation of 
farmer groups is essential (for efficient farmer learning, receiving external support and 
achieving economies of scale), such formation should be accompanied by incentives that 
encourage market participation. A study by Jaleta et al. (2009) established that, market 
participation is determined by the literacy level of the head of household, nearness to market 
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place and households’ market orientation of making production decisions founded on market 
signals. 
     Holden and Binswanger (1998), Eskola (2005) and Jagwe et al. (2009) agreed that, factors 
related to transaction costs, such as geographical location, market information sources, travel 
time to nearest markets, labour availability, farming experience, gender of household head, 
off-farm income and household asset base, affect smallholders’ likelihood and intensity of 
participation in markets. Household labour is a powerful but cheaper asset that leads to 
greater production volumes, positively influencing farmers’ market participation (Lerman, 
2004). 
     In their study, Boughton et al. (2007) revealed that private household assets especially 
land, livestock and farm equipment positively affected market participation. A study by 
Barrett (2007) found that, market participation in staple grains is mainly barred by 
insufficient land, livestock, capital and improved technologies such as farm equipment 
required to generate a surplus that influences market participation. According to Pravakar et 
al. (2010), households with larger land holdings per adult member sell larger volumes of their 
produce as compared to those with smaller land holdings. Moreover, households with 
ownership of larger livestock herds produced and sold more crop produce since they used 
manures from the livestock to enhance crop yields. 
     A study by Jaleta et al. (2009) underscored that ownership of livestock by a household 
negatively affects market participation in the crop market. That is, livestock ownership 
distracts the farmer from venturing into an alternative source of income. Reinforcing on the 
economic theory that favourably higher prices induce increased supply, Enete and Igbokwe 
(2009) and Omiti et al. (2009) also affirmed that better output price and market information is 
crucial to enticing market participation (in form of increased sales through increased supply). 
By contrast however, the household size and non-farm income significantly reduced the sales 
of vegetables in the market, hence less market participation. 
     In their work, Enete and Igbokwe (2009) identified price as an important influencer of the 
level of farmers’ market participation in cassava markets, and that the probability of market 
participation declined with declining farm size for sellers of cassava but increased with farm 
sizes for buyers, though not significant in either case. Different studies have pointed to 
farmers’ failure to use improved inputs (that could accordingly result in competitive 
production), hence less incentives to engage in market oriented production (Ferris et al., 
13 
 
2001; Nkonya and Kato, 2001; Aliguma et al., 2007). In his study, Okoboi (2001) revealed 
that small plots of land and high costs of inputs had limited the potato yields in Uganda 
limiting the profits of smallholder producers hence low market participation. 
2.3 Factors influencing the choice of marketing outlets 
     Giuliani and Padulosi (2005) emphasized the importance of identification of the factors 
faced by households in choosing marketing outlets on realizing the millennium development 
goals. However, as aforementioned, literature on market outlet choices has been thin, 
especially in developing countries where significant frictions make this question most salient. 
It is likely that farmers’ choice of market outlets is determined by the prices they receive 
from sale of produce, with the outlets offering higher benefits logically preferred. A study by 
Zuniga-Aria and Ruben (2007) demonstrated that farm households, including farmers’ 
experience and profitable outlets, attitude toward risk, production systems (farm size and 
production scale), price attributes and market context (having or not of a written contract, 
geographical location and distance to urban market) all influenced the choice of market 
outlets. 
     According to Montshwe (2006), farm gate sales tend to reduce farmer revenues due to 
relatively low prices. With farm size a proxy to production scale, large land sizes imply large 
production scales and vice versa, positively influencing farmers’ decisions to sell their 
produce at market outlets due to economies of scale that lower transaction costs. In an earlier 
study modelled on infrastructure and market access in Madagascar, Minot (1999) observed 
that the choice of marketing outlet among traders is negatively related to the distance to the 
market site. This implies that smallholder farmers tend to sell their outputs at farm gates 
because there is no transaction cost to be incurred. 
     A study by Sigei et al. (2013) found that farmers’ experience, especially for marketing, 
influenced the choice of marketing outlet, with risk takers willing to transport their farm 
produces to distant markets while risk averse ones resorted to sell at farm-gates. Further, they 
found that, price also influences the choice of marketing outlet. Higher prices provide an 
incentive to preferably use a particular outlet, so as to benefit from the higher prices offered 
at the point of sale. Contractual arrangements also guarantee farmers ready markets for their 
produce, with farmers tending to choose outlets that have a ready market. It is therefore 
conceivable, as these different studies have previously observed, that in most cases, farmers 
choose prices offered at farm gates because they incur minimal or no transaction cost. 
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    In an attempt to determine smallholder sweet potato farmers’ participation in different 
market options in Vihiga County, Mutai et al. (2013) discovered that participation in local 
town markets rather than village markets was influenced by credit access, total income, 
transport mode to markets, access to extension services, age, value addition done and the 
quantity of sweet potatoes supplied. They also found that mode of transport, land size 
holdings, quantity of sweet potatoes and gender determined participation for the regional 
outlet option.  
2.4 Theoretical and conceptual framework 
2.4.1 Theoretical framework 
     The derivation of this model starts with the (second-stage) market participation decision, 
and follows a traditional model as in Goetz (1992), Key et al. (2000) and Holloway et al. 
(2005), by incorporating transaction costs into a household utility model specified as follows; 
good i, which households consume in amount ci  and produce in amount qi  using inputs xi . 
Households also choose the amount of good i to market, mi, at price p
m
i . The household has 
an exogenous endowment of good i in the amount of Ai  (which is positive for net sellers and 
negative for net buyers); with exogenous (non-market) transfers, T, representing other 
sources of income which can be positive or negative, thus completing this constraint. 
Exogenous household and farm characteristics are represented by zu  and z q ; and G (·) 
represents the household’s production function describing the relationship between inputs and 
outputs through the production technology G, considering other supply shifters, accounting 
for the fact that market-oriented production decision has already been made (hence it is given 
and known). In absence of transaction costs, the household maximizes the household utility 
function (Equation 1), subject to Equations 2 through 5: 
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     Equations 2-5 represent constraints on maximization of the household utility function. 
Equation 2 represents the household’s budget constraint. Equation 3 states that for each good, 
the amount consumed, sold, and used as inputs must equal amount bought plus an exogenous 
endowment of the good. Equation 4 represents the household’s agricultural production 
technology, which is dependent on quantity produced and inputs used in production, given 
farm characteristics. In Equation 4, z q  is specified as )( z
us
qz
hi
qz
cc
qzq  . z
cc
q  represents 
supply shifters associated with community characteristics, for example, whether there is a 
credit access or presence of farmer cooperative. As in previous studies, z hiq  are lagged 
household investments known to farmers a priori; and zusq  are unknown shocks to 
production, revealed to the farmer after production decisions are made, prior to final 
marketing decisions. 
     Characteristically, indirect utility functions that can be derived from the initial 
optimization, leading to market quantity functions, as in Key et al. (2000) will typically 
arrive at only two decision rules for net buyers and net sellers. However, this study 
introduced a Lagrange problem to represent how three different market regimes are arrived 
at. Therefore, proportional transaction costs are incorporated by changing the household 
budget constraint to the following: 
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     Transaction costs ( t spi
 and t bpi ) reduce the price p
m
i
 the seller receives at the market by 
unobservable amount t spi
 and increases the price paid by the buyer by unobservable 
amount t bpi . Indicator terms 
s
i
 and  bi  take on the value of 1 if the household is a 
seller/buyer and zero otherwise. The agent’s role in the market is represented by the two 
indicator functions:  si  is 1 for sellers of good i and 0 otherwise while 
b
i  is 1 for buyers of 
good i and 0 otherwise thus adding an important condition 1 bi
s
i  which establishes the 
net quantity marketed by stating that a household cannot be both a net buyer and net seller in 
the same period. This implies that the proportional transaction costs for sellers of good i, and 
fixed transaction costs for sellers of good i effectively change the price they receive and thus 
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their behaviour in the market. Similarly, the proportional transaction costs for buyers of good 
i and fixed transaction costs for buyers of good i effectively change the price they pay and 
thus their behaviour in the market. However, these transaction costs are largely unobserved in 
survey data, and are thus represented as functions of more readily enumerable factors 
explaining them. Exogenous factors affecting transaction costs of selling and buying are 
represented by zst  and z
b
t . Transaction costs are an important element in this model for their 
role in explaining autarkic behaviour of market actors. Once they are partitioned into fixed 
and proportional transaction costs, Equation 7 is derived: 
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     Where the household only pays fixed transaction costs, t sfi
, if it sells good i and pays fixed 
transaction costs, t bfi
, if it buys good i; and, t bpi , if it buys good i at proportional transaction 
costs and, t spi , if it sells at proportional transaction costs. Thus, to derive supply and demand 
equations, the utility function is maximized subject to constraints in Equations 3-5, and the 
budget constraint reflecting fixed and proportional transaction costs (Equation 7) used to 
derive Equation 8: 
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     Lagrange multipliers associated with the resource balance, the technology constraint, and 
the cash constraint are represented by i ,   and . The solution to the Lagrangian function 
is solved in two steps. First, the optimal solution, conditional on the market participation 
regime, is solved and then the household chooses the optimal participation regime leading to 
the highest level of utility. First order conditions are then derived as: 
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Based on Equation 12, the market participation decision can be defined as: 
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     When good i is marketed (net sales or net bought), the market participation decision 
includes variable transaction costs t spi  or, t
b
pi , but when good i is not traded the decision 
price becomes the unobservable shadow price 

 i
R 1 . Conditions necessary for household 
market participation can now be established. The maximum utility available to the household 
is represented by an indirect utility function V (p,y,z). For instance considering the case of 
household’s market participation as sellers; using the price for sellers, the indirect utility 
function of the household is: 
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With a corresponding supply function of: 
),( zqt
s
pp
mqqs  ……………………..………………….…...…………………………. 14 
     When households are faced with the decision to participate in the market, they evaluate 
their indirect utility function (Equation 13), which contains both fixed and proportional 
transaction costs. Once the market participation decision has been made, the household 
considers its supply function (Equation 14), which contains proportional costs but not fixed 
costs, to explain the level of market participation. Decreases in transaction costs will lead to 
greater participation in agricultural markets. Once households are involved in markets, a 
reduction in proportional transaction costs will increase household involvement in markets. 
2.4.2 Conceptual framework 
     The producing households first decide whether to participate (buying or selling) or remain 
autarkic; then decide, provided they participate, how much to buy or sell. It is important to 
first acknowledge that not all households in the study area will be AILV producers. Adding a 
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third stage of analysis in a three tired market regime to the traditional two-stage market 
participation model is important as it identifies factors influencing a household’s decision on 
whether or not to commercially produce. Besides, existing models treat participation entirely 
as an ex-ante decision made by the household, while marketing decisions may be, in part, not 
an ex-ante choice but often an artefact of constraints on production and/or a response to 
stochastic production shocks. Following a similar framework by Burke (2009) but focusing 
on this case of AILV, the model allows for the market participation variables to be zero 
because the producing household’s optimizing market participation is autarkic. Moreover, for 
any given household, it predicts the probability that the household is a non-producer and an 
autarkic producer separately, making it necessary to separate producers from non-producer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                Direction of Influence. 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework of market participation. 
Source: Author’s conceptualization modified from Burke (2009). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Study area setting 
     The study was conducted in Nyamira County. It covers an area of 899.3 km2 and lies 
between latitudes 0º 30' and 0º 45' South and 34º 45' and 35º 00' East. Nyamira County 
borders the following counties; Bomet to the South East, Narok to the South, Kisii to the 
West, Homabay to the North and Kericho to the North East. Administratively, the County is 
divided into Borabu, Manga, Masaba North, Nyamira South and Nyamira North Sub-
counties. Politically, the County has four constituencies namely, West Mugirango, North 
Mugirango, Kitutu Masaba and Borabu. Figure 3.1 highlights the study area setting. 
     The altitude ranges from 1,250-2,100 metres above sea level. Temperatures range from a 
mean annual minimum of 10.1°C at night to a mean maximum of 28.7°C during the day, with 
rainfall amounts of between 1,200 mm and 2,100 mm per annum. Agriculture rests as the 
main economic activity employing 80% of the population. Major cash crops grown in the 
area include tea, coffee, sugar cane, bananas and pyrethrum. The main food crops include 
maize, beans, sweet potatoes, vegetables and sorghum. Dairy farming and livestock rearing 
for milk, meat and other products is also practiced by many households. Although the County 
experiences relatively good weather patterns with rainfall occurring regularly throughout the 
year, opportunities still exist for development of large-scale irrigation schemes. 
3.2 Sampling procedure 
     The target population of the study consisted of smallholder farmers in Nyamira County. 
The sampling unit was smallholder AILV farmers. Multi-stage sampling procedure was used 
to arrive at the surveyed sample. First, Nyamira County was purposively selected owing to a 
large number of smallholder AILV producers and huge volumes of the AILV traded within 
the County. The implication for this is that there is substantial AILV market participation. 
Within Nyamira County, Nyamira North Sub-County was purposively selected because it is 
the leading producer of AILV in the County. Therefore, the study ultimately focused in 
Nyamira North Sub-County, with all the wards of Itibo, Bomwagamo, Bokeira, Magwagwa 
and Ekerenyo producing participants for the survey. 
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Figure 3.1: Map of the study area. 
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics - Cartography GIS Section (2009). 
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3.3 Sample size determination and sampling design 
     The determination of the sample size followed a proportionate to size sampling 
methodology as specified by Anderson et al. (2007), written as; 
E
Zpq
n
2
2
 …………………………………………………………….…………..………… 15 
Where: 
n = the sample size; 
p = proportion of the population containing the major attribute of interest. 
q = 1-p. 
Z = confidence level (α = 0.05). 
E = acceptable/allowable error. 
Since the proportion of the population was not known: p = 0.5; q = 1-0.5 = 0.5; z = 
1.96 and e = 0.0615. This resulted to a sample size of 254 respondents calculated as; 
2549.253
0615.0 2
96.1 25.05.0


n  
     Using the 2009 Kenya Bureau of Statistics (KBS) data on the population of the 5 wards of 
interest (clusters) as reported by the Kenya Population and Housing Census, a proportionate 
to population size (PPS) of respondents for each ward was computed to arrive at 254 
respondents interviewed proportionately. The probability of selection for each respondent in 
each of the sampled wards was calculated as; 
%100Pr 


PopulationCountySubTotal
PopulationWard
obability  ……………………...….…... 16 
Table 3.1: Proportionate to population size per ward. 
Ward Population Cumulative Sum Prob. (%) 
Proportionate Respondents 
per Cluster (c) 
1. Itibo 27,598 27,598 22.60 57.00 
2. Bomwagamo 17,252 44,850 14.20 36.00 
3. Bokeira 27,489 72,339 22.50 57.00 
4. Magwagwa 23,355 95,694 19.10 49.00 
5. Ekerenyo 26,659 122,353 21.60 55.00 
Total 122,353  100.00 254.00 
Source: Author’s computation. 
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     A pretested semi-structured questionnaire was administered through face to face 
interviews to collect primary data (qualitative and quantitative); while reviewing of literature 
from selected texts, documented book chapters, annual reports, journals, newsletters and 
other published sources relevant to the study formed the sources of secondary information. 
3.4 Methods of data analysis 
     Based on the objectives of this study, both descriptive statistics and econometric models 
were employed to analyze qualitative and quantitative data. Collected data was coded, 
entered and cleaned using SPSS software, while Microsoft Excel complemented this process 
as back up. A summary of descriptive statistics was subsequently generated from SPSS. Data 
was then transferred to STATA version 12.0 in which econometric analyses was carried out. 
In the analysis, the following analytical framework took precedence: 
     Objective One: Descriptive statistics involving the use of means, percentages, 
frequencies, standard deviations, Chi-square (Chi2) tests and F-tests were employed to 
describe the socio-economic, marketing and institutional characteristics of AILV farmers. 
     Objective Two: Following Bellemare and Barrett (2006) and Muricho et al. (2015), this 
section employed the ordered probit model to implement the market participation problem. 
The motivation for the model comes from the prospective sequencing and jointness 
(simultaneity) of the household’s marketing decisions. In the presence of non-zero censoring 
points, regions between zero and the censoring points may have zero density, for household’s 
net sales (sales minus purchases) volume. This implies that one can partition the continuous 
market participation outcome into three distinct categories: net buyer (households whose net 
sales are negative), autarkic (households whose net sales are equal to zero) and net seller 
(households whose net sales are positive) households. 
     According to Tisdell and Svizzero (2001), a large body of literature recognizes that linear 
regression is inappropriate when the dependent variable is categorical, especially if it is 
qualitative. Following Greene (2003) and Marenya et al. (2015), the appropriate theoretical 
model in such a situation is the ordered probit model because market participation can be 
naturally ordered, for this case, into three categories with the lowest category being net 
buyers of AILV. This model has been widely used as a methodological framework for 
analyzing ordered data since the pioneering work of McKelvey and Zovoina (1975). The link 
between the observed categories and the latent outcome index is thus assumed to be of the 
23 
 
ordered probit type and is a nonlinear model, thus the effect of the explanatory variables can 
be measured in terms of marginal effects. The ordered probit model is conceptualized as; 
uiX iio
NSANBobitOrdered  ),,(Pr  
Where; Net Buyer (NB) = 0; Autarky (A) = 1; Net Seller (NS) = 2 
Explicitly the market participation equation was modelled as follows. The specific regressors 
(Xi’s) are presented in Table 3.2; 
eiX ninX iX iX ioY   ...332211 …………………………….......…. 17 
     Because these three market categories are logically ordered, and since it is informative to 
distinguish between net buyers and net sellers rather than just lump them together as market 
participants, an ordered probit participation decision is estimated. This approach also allows 
for non-zero censoring points at the first stage, that is, the thresholds below and above which 
a household will find it worthwhile to be a net buyer or a net seller, respectively, as in Key et 
al. (2000) and Holloway et al. (2005). The decision to participate in the AILV market as a net 
seller, an autarkic or a net buyer is trichotomous in nature. Households are assumed to 
participate in a market regime that maximizes their expected utility over their planning 
horizon. Consider the following latent model M ji
* which describes the i𝑡ℎ household’s 
behaviour of participating in market regime j (j=0, 1 and 2): 
 jiX jijM ji 
* ………………………………………………………………….……. 18 
     Where M denotes the latent dependent variables which can be represented by the level of 
expected benefit and/or utility derived from participating in market regime j, Xs are a vector 
of covariates influencing the j𝑡ℎ market participation regime and βs are associated vector of 
parameters, and ε are the unobserved factors influencing market participation. The 
household’s utility from participating in a given market regime is not observable but the 
decision to participate is observable. The farmer will choose market regime j if: 



 
otherwise
M jiif
0
0*1
. 
     The parameters βj were estimated using coefficients of the ordered probit that allows for 
multiple ordered values (net sellers, autarkic and net buyers). 
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Table 3.2: Variables used and expected outcomes in the ordered probit model. 
Variable(X) Description Measurement Expected Sign 
Agehh Age of the household head Number of years   
Edcnhh Education level of the household head Number of years + 
Housyz Household size Number of 
members 
  
Exprnc Experience in marketing Number of years + 
Gendhh Gender of the household head 0 = Female; 1 = 
Male 
  
Landown Land ownership (title deed) 0 = No; 1 = Yes + 
Foodsuff Households’ food self sufficiency 0 = No; 1 = Yes + 
Groupmemb Group membership 0 = No; 1 = Yes + 
Contract Contractual marketing 0 =No; 1 = Yes + 
Nonfarm Participation in non-farm activities 0 =No; 1 = Yes   
Trans Ownership of transport equipment 0 =No; 1 = Yes + 
Credit Access to credit 0 =No; 1 = Yes + 
Mrktinfo Access to market information 0 =No; 1 = Yes + 
Distfrmrkt Distance from farm to market Kilometers - 
Farmsyz Farm size Acres + 
Extension Number of extension contacts Number of visits + 
 
     Objective 3: This was analyzed with two things in mind. First, an analysis of factors 
motivating the use of a combination of market outlets was carried out. Second, the 
implication of using various combinations of market outlets on the selected outcome variable 
(AILV income) was done. The selection bias was controlled for using a multinomial 
endogenous switching treatment effects approach. This approach emulated a similar 
framework employed by Teklewold et al. (2013). The intention was to determine whether 
using market outlets in combination provided more economic benefits and earned 
smallholders better income than using individual outlets (whether farmers should use market 
outlets in isolation or in combinations). Most previous impact analyses on income (as 
determined by market outlets) studies have focused on analyses of single market outlets using 
single equation models (probit or logit). This follows a similar observation that focused on 
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technology adoption by Gebremedhin and Scott (2003) and Kassie et al. (2011). As noted 
earlier however, farmers are faced with market outlet alternatives that may be used 
simultaneously as complements, substitutes or supplements to deal with their overlapping 
constraints such as transaction costs offered by different outlets, distance to reach market 
outlets, as well as prices offered by different outlets. 
     Studies by Dorfman (1996), Khanna (2001) and Moyo and Veeman (2004) have all 
reported this phenomenon on farmers facing adoption decisions of different technology 
alternatives. Observing from Wu and Babock (1998) and Khanna (2001), earlier studies also 
ignored that, the possibility of the choice of outlets adopted more recently by farmers may be 
partly dependent on earlier choices. Adoption and impact analysis of outlets that ignore these 
inter-relationships may underestimate or overestimate the influence of various factors on the 
adoption of market outlets and their impacts on incomes that farmers derive. This follows Wu 
and Babcock (1998). Employing a similar framework by Dorfman (1996) on technology 
adoption (but focusing on market outlets for this study), modelling of market outlets adoption 
and impact analysis in a multiple outlet choice framework is important to capture useful 
economic information contained in interdependent and simultaneous adoption decisions. 
3.4.1 Specification of market outlets combinations 
     The market outlets considered for this study were farm gate, local rural markets and 
nearest urban markets, providing eight possible combinations. F0L0U0 indicates that 
households did not use any market outlets while F1L1U1 indicates that households used all 
three outlets. Table 3.3 illustrates how this was achieved. Each element in the triplet is a 
binary variable for market outlets combinations: Selling at farm gate (F), local market (L) or 
nearest urban market (U). Subscript 1 depicts using of a market outlet and 0, otherwise. After 
this, the unconditional and conditional probabilities of using different outlets was computed 
to show the interdependence of various outlets combinations. 
     In the first stage, farmers’ choice of combinations of market outlets was modelled using 
multinomial logit selection model while recognizing the inter-relationships among the 
choices. In the second stage of the estimation, the impact of each combination of outlets on 
the outcome variable (income) was evaluated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with a 
selectivity correction term from the first stage. 
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Table 3.3: Specification of market outlets combinations. 
Choice (j) 
Binary triplet 
(package) 
Farm Gate 
Local Rural 
Markets 
Nearest Urban 
Markets 
  F1 F0 L1 L0 U1 U0 
1 F0L0U0          
2 F1L0U0          
3 F0L1U0          
4 F0L0U1          
5 F1L1U0          
6 F1L0U1          
7 F0L1U1          
8 F1L1U1          
      
3.4.2 Multinomial adoption selection model 
     Farmers are assumed to aim to maximize their profit, Ui, by comparing the profit provided 
by m alternative packages. The requirement for farmer i to choose any outlet, j, over any 
alternative outlet, m, is that Uij > Uim and m ≠ j, or equivalently ΔUim = Uij − Uim > 0 and m ≠ 
j. The expected profit, U ij
* , that the farmer derives from the use of package j is a latent 
variable determined by observed household, plot and location characteristics (Xi) and 
unobserved characteristics (εij): 
 ijjX iU ij 
*  ………………………………………………..……………..………….. 19 
     Where Xi is observed exogenous variables (household, plot and location characteristics) 
and εij is unobserved characteristics. Let (I) be an index that denotes the farmer’s choice of 
outlets, such that: 
 
………………….……………….….. 20 
Where  iJ  = )
**max( U ijU im
jm


 < 0 (Bourguignon et al., 2007). Equation 20 implies that the 
ith farmer will use outlet j to maximize his expected profit if  j provides greater expected 
profit than any other package m ≠ j, that is,  iJ  = )
**max( U ijU im
jm


 > 0. 
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     Assuming that ε are identically and independently Gumbel distributed, the probability that 
farmer i with characteristics X will choose j can be specified by a multinomial logit model 
(McFadden, 1973): 



J
m
mX i
jX i
X iijPij
1
)exp(
exp(
)|0Pr(


   ……………………………………….….…..… 21 
The parameters of the latent variable model can be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
     In the second stage of multinomial endogenous switching regression (ESR), the 
relationship between the outcome variables and a set of exogenous variables was estimated 
for the chosen outlets. In this specification, the base category which is the non-use of any 
outlet (F0L0U0), is denoted as j = 1. In the remaining outlets (j = 2 … 8), at least one outlet is 
used. The outcome equation for each possible regime j is thus given as: 









JI
I
if
if
uiJJZ iQiJ
uiZ iQi
jgime
gime 11111
Re
Re


   ……………………………………………….…... 22 
     Where Qij's are the outcome variables of the i
th farmer in regime j, and the error terms (u's) 
are distributed with E (uij|X,Z) = 0 and var (uij|X,Z) = σj2. Qij is observed if, and only if, outlet 
j is used, which occurs when )*max(* U im
jm
U ij

 .  If the ε's and u's are not independent, OLS 
estimates in Equation 22 will be biased. A consistent estimation of αj requires inclusion of the 
selection correction terms of the alternative choices in Equation 22. The model assumes the 
following linearity assumption: 
))(()1|(  imE
J
jm
imr jjiJiU ijE 

  
     With 0
1
 
J
m r j
 (by construction, the correlation between u's and ε's sums to zero). 
Using this assumption, the equation of the multinomial ESR in Equation 21 is specified as: 
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     Where σj is the covariance between ε's and u's, and λj is the inverse Mills ratio computed 
from the estimated probabilities in Equation 21 as follows: 
)](
1
)(
[ PijIn
Pim
PimInPim
J
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
  …………………………………….…………….… 24 
     Where ρ is the correlation coefficient of ε's, and u's and ω's are error terms with an 
expected value of zero. In the multinomial choice setting, there are J−1 selection correction 
terms, one for each alternative package. The standard errors in Equation 23 are bootstrapped 
to account for the heteroskedasticity arising from the generated regressor (λj). 
3.4.3 Estimation of average treatment effects 
     The above framework can be used to examine the average treatment effects (ATE) by 
comparing the expected outcomes of various outlets. The challenge of impact evaluation 
using observational data is to estimate the counterfactual outcome, which is the income the 
users of a particular outlet could have earned had they not used the outlet (opportunity cost). 
Following Carter and Milon (2005) and Di Falco and Veronesi (2011), the ATE in the actual 
and counterfactual scenarios is computed as follows. Actual users of market outlets observed 
among users in the sample (USERS): 
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     Users of market outlets had they decided not to use an outlet (counterfactual) (NON-
USERS): 
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     These expected values are used to derive unbiased estimates of the ATE. The ATE is 
defined as the difference between Equations 25a and 26a or Equations 25b and 26b. For 
instance, the difference between Equations 25a and 26a is given as: 
)12()12(]2|1[]2|2[   iZiIQiEIQiEATT  ………………....……. 27 
     The first term on the right-hand side of Equation 27 represents the expected change in 
users of market outlets’ mean outcome, if users’ characteristics had the same return as non-
users (had users opted not to market) and if users had the same characteristics as non-users. 
The second term (λj) is the selection term that captures all potential effects of difference in 
unobserved variables. Specific explanatory variables used in the multinomial endogenous 
switching regression (ESR) are presented in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Variables used and expected outcomes in the ESR model. 
Variable Description Measurement Expected Sign 
Agehh Age of the household head Number of years   
Edcnhh Education level of the household head Number of years + 
Housyz Household size Number of 
members 
  
Exprnc Experience in marketing Number of years + 
Gendhh Gender of the household head 0 = Female; 1 = 
Male 
  
Landown Land ownership (title deed) 0 = No; 1 = Yes + 
Foodsuff Households’ food self sufficiency 0 = No; 1 = Yes + 
Groupmemb Group membership 0 = No; 1 = Yes + 
Contract Contractual marketing 0 =No; 1 = Yes + 
Nonfarm Participation in non-farm activities 0 =No; 1 = Yes   
Trans Ownership of transport equipment 0 =No; 1 = Yes + 
Credit Access to credit 0 =No; 1 = Yes + 
Mrktinfo Access to market information 0 =No; 1 = Yes + 
Distfrmrkt Distance from farm to market Kilometers - 
Farmsyz Farm size Acres + 
Extension Number of extension contacts Number of visits + 
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3.5 Statistical and specification tests 
     Before performing regressions, all hypothesized explanatory variables were checked for 
the existence of the statistical multicollinearity problems. Multicollinearity arises due to a 
linear relationship among explanatory variables and the problem is that, it might cause the 
estimated regression coefficients to have wrong signs, smaller t-ratios for many of the 
variables in the regression and high R-square (R2) value. Moreover, it causes large variance 
and standard error with a wide confidence interval hence becoming difficult to estimate 
accurately the effect of each variable (Gujarati, 2007 and Woodridge, 2002). If collinearity 
was high, estimation of regression coefficients though possible would have had large 
standard errors and thus the population values of the coefficients would not have been 
estimated precisely (Gujarati, 2007). There are different methods suggested to detect the 
existence of multicollinearity problem between the model regressors. According to Gujarati 
(2007), the variance inflating factor (VIF) technique is commonly used in an array of 
literature; and was therefore also preferred in the present study to detect multicollinearity 
problem among continuous explanatory variables. In Gujarati (2004), the VIF is described as 
how the variance of an estimator is inflated by the presence of multicollinearity. 
Mathematically, VIF for an individual explanatory variable (Xi) is computed as: 
)21(
1)(
R
X iVIF

 , where R2 is the coefficient of correlation among regressors. 
     Gujarati (2007) explained that larger values of VIF indicate stronger collinearity among 
one or more model explanatory variables. As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a variable exceeds 
10, which will happen if a multiple R2 exceeds 0.90, that variable is said to be highly collinear 
(Gujarati, 2007). Alternatively, the inverse of VIF (1/VIF), called tolerance (TOL), can be 
executed to detect multicollinearity. The closer the TOL of one explanatory variable (Xi) is to 
zero, the greater the degree of collinearity of that variable with the other regressors. On the 
other hand, the closer the TOL of Xi is to one, the greater the evidence that Xi is not collinear 
with the other regressors (Gujarati, 2007). The contingency coefficient (CC) method was 
used to detect the degree of association among discrete explanatory variables following Healy 
(1984). According to Healy (1984), the discrete/dummy variables are said to be collinear if 
the value of contingency coefficient (CC) is greater than 0.75. Mathematically, it is computed 
as: 
Xn
X
CC
2
2

 , where CC is the contingency coefficient; n is sample size and X2 is a 
Chi-square (Chi2) value. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1 Descriptive results 
4.1.1 Socioeconomic characteristics of different types of AILV farmers 
     The different types of producers are net buyers, net sellers and autarkic. The results of the 
socio-economic characteristics for continuous explanatory variables are presented in Table 
4.1. The education level of the household head was significantly different at 10% level of 
significance. The net sellers and autarkic household heads both had a mean of 10 years of 
schooling, while the net buyers had a mean of 8 years of schooling. The higher education 
levels among autarkic and net sellers suggested that, farmers with higher levels of education 
were more open to new ideas and more likely to be risk takers. They could therefore break 
away from farm enterprises they previously engaged in and venture into new enterprises 
(AILV) in pursuant of better income and livelihoods. The educational status of the household 
head is an important element in smallholder economic activities. Formal education has been 
found to enhance managerial competence and successful implementation of improved 
production, processing and marketing practices (Marenya and Barret, 2007). Further, 
Makhura et al. (2001) stated that human capital, represented by the household head’s formal 
education, is posited to increase a household understanding of market dynamics and therefore 
improve decision about the amount of output sold, inter alia. 
     Intriguingly, Irungu et al. (2007) reported that AILV farmers were more educated than 
other categories of traders, implying that the production of AILV is a field for those endowed 
with human capital. This might be because one has to acquire knowledge on several aspects 
of AILV, for instance, their nutritive value and marketing strategies, before embarking on 
their production. Education helps to unlock the natural talents and inherent enterprising 
qualities of the farmers, thus making them more skilled and more responsive to risk taking 
and change than the illiterate farmers (Nwaru, 2004). People with high education level are 
likely to analyse and interpret information than those who have less education or no 
education at all (Marther and Adelzadeh, 1998). 
     The farm size was statistically different at 5% significance level with the net buyers, 
autarchies and net sellers owning 2.36, 1.52 and 1.98 acres of land respectively. The net 
buyers had the largest land holdings, possibly because, AILV are a relatively new venture, 
and so instead of digressing to production of AILV, net buyers stuck to previously produced 
crops such as maize and beans condemning them to be buyers of AILV. 
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Table 4.1: Socioeconomic characteristics of smallholders for continuous explanatory variables (F-test).  
Variable 
Overall Mean 
n = 254 
Means of Market Participants by Categories   
Net Buyers 
n = 22 
Autarkic 
n = 17 
Net Sellers 
n = 215 
F-Test Pr. > F 
Age of the HHH 47.51 (10.88) 45.96 (9.99) 47.41 (11.96) 47.67 (10.92) 0.78 0.84 
Education of the HHH 9.65 (3.95) 8.46 (2.76) 9.88 (4.27) 9.76 (4.03) 1.60* 0.06 
Household size 6.14 (2.04) 6.32 (1.59) 5.88 (1.65) 6.14 (2.11) 0.91 0.55 
Farm size 1.98 (1.49) 2.36 (1.77) 1.52 (1.55) 1.98 (1.59) 2.33** 0.03 
Income from AILV 16612.52 (29967.15) 2274.76 (2910.74) 3552.65 (3489.42) 19122.86 (31916.21) 0.87 0.76 
Note: HHH is for household head; Figures in parentheses are standard deviations; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. 
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     This gave the picture of risk averseness. This finding contradicted that of Machethe et al. 
(2008), who found that land is a critical production asset having a direct bearing on 
production of a marketable surplus. In supporting the finding by Machethe et al. (2008), 
Branson and Norvell (1983) discovered that, expanding the land under crop production 
increased the volume of marketable produce. 
     The results of the socioeconomic characteristics of smallholders for discrete explanatory 
variables are presented in Table 4.2. The dummy for whether a farmer had a title deed or not 
was statistically significant at 5% level. About 86.36% of net buyers did not possess title 
deeds while 13.64% had title deeds. For autarkic households, 88.24% did not own land, while 
11.76% had title deeds. Correspondingly, 64.65% of net sellers did not own land, while 
35.35% had title deeds. Ownership of title deeds was highest among net sellers and this could 
explain their ability to develop land (boosting production) or possibly obtain cash loans (to 
fund marketing operations such as meeting transportation costs), enabling them to become 
net sellers. The high proportion of no land ownership, by virtue of possessing title deeds, 
could be explained by: increasing population pressure resulting to land fragmentation, 
especially in hereditary systems of land sub division among siblings, leaving them with no 
land titles as the original deeds remain with their parents. Ownership of land influences 
agriculture productivity, because farmers who do not own land can be reluctant to develop 
and maintain the land (Randela et al., 2000). Furthermore, such farmers may have difficulty 
in obtaining loans for agricultural purposes because they cannot use the land as collateral. 
     The ability of households to meet their food needs was statistically different at 5% 
significance level across the market regimes. For the net buyers, 100% were not self-
sufficient in terms of food production; about 88.24% of autarkic households were not self-
sufficient in terms of food production, while 11.76% were able to produce enough family 
food. On the other hand, 26.51% of net sellers were able to produce enough family food, 
while 73.49% were not able to meet their family food needs. The inability of households to 
meet their food needs was highest for net buyers. All net buyers were not able to meet their 
family food needs thus had to buy AILV, explaining their participation in markets as net 
buyers. The study by Lukanu et al. (2004) revealed that household food availability is one 
among the factors that affects farmers’ decision to commercially produce. 
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Table 4.2: Socioeconomic characteristics of smallholders for discrete explanatory variables (Chi2 test).  
Variable 
 
Overall 
n = 254 
Number of Market Participants by Categories   
Description Net Buyers 
n = 22 
Autarkic 
n = 17 
Net Sellers 
n = 215 
Pearson Chi2 Pr 
Gender of the HHH Male 184 (72.44) 15 (68.18) 13 (76.47) 156 (72.56) 0.340 0.844 
 Female 70 (27.56) 7 (31.82) 4 (23.53) 59 (27.44) 
Land ownership Yes 81 (31.89) 3 (13.64) 2 (11.76) 76 (35.35) 7.729** 0.021 
 No 173 (68.11) 19 (86.36) 15 (88.24) 139 (64.65) 
Food self sufficiency Yes 59 (23.23) 0 (0.00) 2 (11.76) 57 (26.51) 9.209** 0.010 
 No 195 (76.77) 22 (100.00) 15 (88.24) 158 (73.49) 
Non-farm income activities Yes 107 (42.13) 7 (31.82) 3 (17.65) 97 (45.12) 5.926* 0.052 
 No 147 (57.87) 15 (68.18) 14 (82.35) 118 (54.88) 
Transport equipment owned Yes 60 (23.62) 2 (9.09) 2(11.76) 56 (26.05) 4.600 0.100 
 No 194 (76.38) 20 (90.91) 15 (88.24) 159 (73.95) 
Note: HHH stands for household head; Figures in parentheses are percentages; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. 
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     Participation in non-farm income generating activities was statistically significant at 10% 
level with 45.12%, 17.65% and 31.82% of net sellers, autarchies and net buyers 
(respectively) participating in non-farm income generating activities. Net sellers had the 
highest proportion of participants in non-farm income generating activities. This could 
explain their participation in markets as net sellers, possibly because they finance AILV 
production and marketing activities through off farm incomes. Rao and Qaim (2011) found 
that income from off farm activities could be used to finance farm investment required for 
farmers’ participation in high value markets. Alene et al. (2008) noted that non-farm income 
contributes to more marketed output if it is invested in farm technology and other farm 
improvements. 
4.1.2 Institutional and access characteristics of different types of AILV farmers 
     The results of the institutional and access characteristics of smallholders for continuous 
explanatory variables are presented in Table 4.3. The distance from smallholders’ homes to 
farms, as well as from farms to markets were statistically different at 1% and 5% significance 
levels. The net sellers had the shortest distances from homes to farms at 0.51 kilometers, 
followed by net buyers at 1.20 kilometers and lastly, autarkic households had the longest 
distance at 3.40 kilometers. The distance from farms to markets was longest for net buyers 
(3.02km), followed by net sellers (2.70km) and then the autarkic farmers (2.21km). Net 
buyers had the longest distance separating them from markets. Longer distances translated to 
high transportation costs therefore justifying their participation in markets as net buyers, 
instead of incurring transportation costs of AILV to markets. 
     The distance from the farm to point of sale was found, in a couple of studies, to be a major 
constraint to the intensity of market participation (Goetz, 1992; Montshwe, 2006; Bahta and 
Bauer, 2007; Omiti et al., 2009). Minot (1999) showed that the choice of marketing outlet 
among traders is negatively related to the distance to the market site. Ogunleye and Oladeji 
(2007) found that a greater distance to the market increases transportation costs and 
marketing costs and this hampers the extent of market participation. 
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Table 4.3: Institutional and access characteristics for continuous explanatory variables (F-test).  
Variable 
Overall Mean 
n = 254 
Means of Market Participants by Categories   
Net Buyers 
n = 22 
Autarkic 
n = 17 
Net Sellers 
n = 215 
F-Test Pr. > F 
Distance (Home-Farm) 1.00 (3.56) 1.20 (2.30) 3.40 (12.03) 0.51 (1.78) 2.11** 0.03 
Distance (Farm-Market) 2.85 (3.90) 3.01 (1.77) 2.21 (1.70) 2.70 (4.27) 3.00*** 0.00 
Number of extension visits 3.81 (3.25) 2.91 (1.85) 3.82 (3.57) 3.90 (3.34) 1.36 0.20 
Marketing experience 7.76 (7.46) 3.10 (4.22) 5.16 (3.26) 8.48 (7.79) 1.72** 0.02 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations; ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level. 
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     Experience in marketing AILV was found to significantly vary across participants of the 
different markets regimes at 5% significant level with net buyers having an average of 3 
years of market participation experience, 5 years for autarchies and 8 years for net sellers. 
Experience was highest among net sellers which implied that farmers with higher number of 
years of experience had higher participation as net sellers, possibly reflecting their ability to 
negotiate and achieve better terms of trade. Abay (2007) found an increase in farmers’ 
experience resulted in the increases of tomato being supplied to the market. Further, these 
farmers will have stronger social networks and will have established credibility within the 
network (Makhura et al., 2001). 
     The results of the institutional characteristics of smallholders for discrete explanatory 
variables are presented in Table 4.4. The dummy for contractual marketing was statistically 
different at 1% significance level with 0% of net buyers under contract, 11.76% and 28.84% 
of autarkic and net seller (respectively) having contracts. Net sellers had their highest 
proportions of contracted farmers. Marketing under contract increased market participation 
because farmers were guaranteed a ready market, plausibly explaining the high proportion of 
contractual arrangements for net sellers. Habwe et al. (2008) recognized the importance of 
technical support such as market linkages, where contracted farmers of AILV are linked to 
city supermarkets, informal markets and individual vendors, food processing and preparation 
joints for sustainable utilization of AILV. 
     Access to credit was significantly different at 1% significance level with 59.07% of net 
sellers having access to credit, while 41.18% and 18.18% of autarkic and net buyers having 
access to credit as well. The proportion of farmers who had access to credit was highest 
among net sellers. This could explain their ability to invest in production enhancing 
technologies, hence producing surpluses for markets, as well as funding marketing activities 
such as searching for information and transporting produce. Mutai et al. (2013) postulated 
that access to credit gives the farmer more cash resources hence it has an effect on their 
marketing activities. Immink and Alarcon (1993) and Lerman (2004) support the finding of 
the current study by arguing for agricultural credit as it plays a vital role in the process of 
smallholder commercialization. Credit facilitates the introduction of innovative technologies 
and ensures input and output marketing arrangements (Reddy, 1998). 
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Table 4.4: Institutional characteristics for discrete dummy variables (Chi2 test).  
Variable 
 
Overall 
n = 254 
Number of Market Participants by Categories   
Description Net Buyers 
n = 22 
Autarkic 
n = 17 
Net Sellers 
n = 215 
Pearson Chi2 Pr 
Group membership Yes 231 (90.94) 21 (95.45) 16 (94.12) 194 (90.23) 0.884 0.643 
No 23 (9.06) 1 (4.55) 1 (5.88) 21 (9.77) 
Contractual marketing Yes 64 (25.20) 0 (0.00) 2 (11.76) 62 (28.84) 10.550*** 0.005 
No 190 (74.80) 22 (100.00) 15 (88.24) 153 (71.16) 
Credit access Yes 138 (54.33) 4 (18.18) 7 (41.18) 127 (59.07) 14.718*** 0.001 
No 116 (45.67) 18 (81.82) 10 (58.82) 88 (40.93) 
Market information Yes 134 (52.76) 6 (27.27) 10 (58.82) 118 (54.88) 6.374** 0.041 
No 120 (47.24) 16 (72.73) 7 (41.18) 97 (45.12) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages; ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level. 
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          Access to market information was statistically significant at 5% level, with autarkic 
households having the highest proportion (58.82%) of those with access to market 
information. The proportion of those with market information among net sellers was 54.88% 
and 27.27% among net buyers. Autarkic and net seller households had higher proportions of 
farmers who had access to market information compared to net buyers. Access to market 
information was postulated to reduce the costs of searching for market information as well as 
addressing the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. This in turn motivated 
farmers to move away from lower positions of market participation (net buyers) to higher 
market positions of autarchies and net buyers, in order to engage profitably in marketing. 
Studies by Enete and Igbokwe (2009) and Omiti et al. (2009) underscored the importance of 
price and market information in luring smallholders to participate in markets.  
4.2 Econometric results 
4.2.1 Determinants of market participation behaviour for AILV 
     An ordered probit model was used to analyze the determinants of market participation 
among smallholder AILV farmers. However, it is worth mentioning that 22 respondents 
(8.66%) were net buyers, 17 (6.69%) were autarkic and 215 (84.65%) were net sellers of 
AILV. Socioeconomic and institutional variables were hypothesized to influence market 
participation by typology (net seller, net buyer and autarkic regimes). Prior to conducting the 
regression analysis, both the continuous and discrete explanatory variables were checked for 
the existence of multicollinearity using the variance inflating factor (VIF) and the 
contingency coefficient (CC) methods respectively. Accordingly, the test results are 
presented in Table 4.5 for VIF and Table 4.6 for CC. The results revealed no serious 
multicollinearity problem. By rule of thumb, there was no strong association among 
hypothesized explanatory variables (VIF values are less than 10 and CC values are less than 
0.75), therefore, all of the proposed potential explanatory variables were included in the 
ordered probit regression. 
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Table 4.5: Variance inflating factor test results for continuous explanatory variables. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Age of the household head 1.53 0.655 
Education level of the household head 1.29 0.773 
Marketing experience 1.28 0.784 
Number of extension contacts 1.22 0.818 
Household size 1.22 0.818 
Farm size 1.12 0.892 
Distance from the farm to the market 1.07 0.935 
Mean VIF 1.25  
 
Table 4.6: Contingency coefficient test results for discrete explanatory variables. 
 Gendhh Landown Foodsuff Groupmemb Contract Partnonfrm Owntrans Credit Mrktinfo 
Gendhh 1.0000         
Landown -0.0695 1.0000        
Foodsuff 0.0472 0.1437 1.0000       
Groupmemb -0.1025 0.0099 0.0111 1.0000      
Contract 0.0129 -0.1442 0.1317 0.1199 1.0000     
Partnonfrm 0.0622 -0.1390 0.1727 -0.0920 0.4782 1.0000    
Owntrans 0.0111 0.0172 0.0014 0.1432 0.3818 0.2201 1.0000   
Credit 0.0713 -0.0171 0.0738 0.2615 0.4047 0.3180 0.2122 1.0000  
Mrktinfo 0.1752 0.0553 -0.0024 0.0861 0.1678 -0.0072 0.3035 0.2089 1.0000 
41 
 
     Informed by these test results, the ordered probit model regression was conducted and the 
results are presented in Table 4.7. The ordered probit model of discrete market participation 
yielded intuitive results. The non-zero censoring points were of negative signs, with the lower 
censoring threshold at -2.25 (AILV net purchases) and the upper threshold at -1.79 (AILV net 
sales), each statistically significantly different from zero. These estimates suggested that 
purchases or sales of less than 1 kilogram were generally uneconomical, given the monetary 
and non-monetary costs of market participation in the study area. This, according to 
Bellemare and Barret (2006), could be explained by people’s willingness to enter the market 
for smaller volume sales than purchases, likely reflecting the fact that sales of AILV are 
essentially means by which households meet immediate cash needs related to payment of 
school fees, food purchases and ceremonial or emergency health expenses. 
     The goodness-of-fit measured by the Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 showed that the choice of 
explanatory variables included in the ordered probit model explained the variation in 
decisions to participate in the market by typology. The likelihood ratio tests indicated that the 
slope coefficients were significantly different from zero for participation decisions. The 
pseudo R-square of 0.2228 was above the statistical threshold of 20% demonstrating that the 
explanatory variables described about 22.28% of the covariates considered in the model. 
     The number of years smallholders participated in AILV marketing (Experience) positively 
influenced the likelihood of households being net sellers at 5% significance level, ceteris 
paribus. Older household heads could therefore take advantage of their experience to obtain 
superior yields, hence better income, thus likely moving them towards net sellers’ position in 
the market. In addition to developing strong networks with buyers, the experience a farmer 
had likely reflected higher bargaining power. Abay (2007) found evidence that an increase in 
farmers’ experience caused an increases in tomatoes supplied to the market in Fogere, South 
Gonder. 
     Land ownership positively influenced the likelihood of farmers participating in markets as 
net sellers, all else held constant. This variable was found to be statistically different at 5% 
significance level. Possibly, smallholders possessing larger land sizes were more likely to 
increase the proportion of land under AILV production. This could translate to higher yields, 
increasing the probability of producing surpluses that are sold off to the market thus moving 
them towards becoming net sellers. Branson and Norvell (1983) discovered that expanding 
the land area under crop production increased the volume of marketable produce.      
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Table 4.7: Results of the ordered probit regression for market participation behaviour. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P > |z| 
Age of the HHH -0.016 0 .013 -1.18 0.240 
Education level of the HHH 0.006 0 .035 0.17 0.864 
Household size 0.007 0.067 0.10 0.921 
Experience in marketing 0 .071** 0.029 2.50 0.013 
Gender of the HHH 0 .021 0.264 0.08 0.937 
Land ownership 0.810** 0.314 2.58 0.010 
Food self sufficiency 1.005** 0.442 2.27 0.023 
Group membership -0.714 0.455 -1.57 0.116 
Contractual marketing 1.395** 0.667 2.09 0.036 
Access of non-farm income -0.254 0 .296 -0.86 0.390 
Ownership of transport 0 .327 0 .372 0.88 0.379 
Access to credit 0 .849*** 0 .280 3.04 0.002 
Access to market information -0.248 0 .268 -0.93 0.355 
Distance from farm to market 0 .014 0.046 0.31 0.759 
Farm size -0.117 0 .081 -1.45 0.148 
Number of extension contacts -0.133** 0 .062 -2.15 0.032 
Ancillary Parameters 
/cut1 -2.248 0.821   
/cut2 -1.789 0 .815   
Number of Observations = 254 
LR Chi2 (16) = 60.43 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2228 
Log likelihood = -105.4122 
z and P > |z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; HHH is for household head. 
     Households’ food self-sufficiency positively influenced the likelihood of households being 
net sellers at 5% significance level, keeping the effects of other variables constant. The non-
zero censoring points of the ordered probit model suggested that it is probable that 
households engaged in AILV marketing to meet immediate family needs such as food. It 
could be that smallholders started off as subsistence producers of AILV, but once their 
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households became food sufficient, they entered AILV markets to sell off remaining portions 
of produced AILV, likely moving them towards becoming net sellers. Lukanu et al. (2004) 
verified that households’ food availability is one among the factors that affects farmers’ 
decision to commercially produce. 
     Contractual marketing had a positive influence on the likelihood of households 
participating in markets as net sellers at 5% significance level. In the uncertain world of 
farming, fluctuating market conditions, especially price and the promise of making sales is a 
thorny issue to farmers. Contracts between buyers of AILV and producers therefore 
guarantee smallholders ready markets, thus income. This could further have motivated 
farmers to perpetually move towards being net sellers, as ready markets guaranteed them 
income from farming AILV. Jari and Fraser (2009) found an increase in formal market 
participation made possible by contractual agreements amongst smallholders and emerging 
farmers in the Kat river valley, South Africa. 
     Access to credit was positive and significantly different at 1% significance level, ceteris 
paribus. Credit gives smallholders cash resources that they could invest in marketing 
activities such as value addition to improve incomes, or even invest in transportation to 
further off lucrative markets which, otherwise, are inaccessible. In the pursuit of better 
incomes, credit boosts that improve on AILV marketing would likely have pushed farmers 
towards becoming net sellers. Mutai et al. (2013) corroborated that participation in sweet 
potato markets in Vihiga County, Kenya was influenced by credit access. Credit also 
facilitates the introduction of innovative technologies and ensures input and output marketing 
arrangements (Reddy, 1998). 
     The number of visits by extension workers negatively influenced the likelihood of 
smallholders being net sellers at 5% significance level. This was intriguing since access to 
extension service, through extension officers, was expected to play an imperative role in 
empowering farmers with marketing information and ability, thus increasing the likelihood of 
households becoming net sellers. It could be that extension officers were more conversant 
with information relating to traditionally grown crops such as maize and beans and not on 
AILV. Lack of sufficient information condemns smallholders to become autarkic and net 
buyers of AILV. AILV have only started receiving attention in the contemporary years as 
high value nutritional crops, thus fuelling their recent demand. This finding contravenes that 
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of Mutai et al. (2013) who found a positive impact of extension services on market 
participation.  
4.2.2 Combinations of market outlets with the highest payoffs 
     This section describes the factors that influenced the choice of combination of market 
outlets (packages), and then quantified the impact of the choice of market packages on the 
income farmers derived. This was achieved using the multinomial endogenous switching 
regression (MNL ESR) model. First, the sample unconditional and conditional probabilities 
were computed to highlight the existence of interdependence across the three individual 
market outlets (farm gate, local markets and urban markets) before combinations. From Table 
4.8, the sample joint and marginal probabilities were deduced. The unconditional probability 
of observing all three types (F1L1U1) at once was at the rate of 3.7% (0.037). The sample 
unconditional probability of observing only “Farm Gate” was 23.4% (0.234), only “Local 
Markets” was 21.7% (0.217) and only “Urban Markets” was 2.5% (0.025). Their respective 
conditional probabilities (Table 4.9) were 72.95%, 71.72% and 11.48%. 
Table 4.8: Summary statistics for market outlet combinations. 
Choice Binary Triplet Frequency Percent 
1 F1L1U1 9.00 3.70 
2 F1L1Uo 106.00 43.44 
3 F1LoU1 6.00 2.50 
4 F1LoUo 57.00 23.40 
5 FoL1U1 7.00 2.90 
6 FoL1Uo 53.00 21.70 
7 FoLoU1 6.00 2.50 
Total  244.00 100.00 
 
Table 4.9: The unconditional and conditional probabilities of market packages (%). 
 Farm Gate (F) Local Markets (L) Urban Markets (U) 
P(Yk = 1) 72.95 71.72 11.48 
P(Yk = 1|YF = 1) 100.00 64.61 8.43 
P(Yk = 1|YL = 1) 65.71 100.00 9.14 
P(Yk = 1|YU = 1) 53.57 57.14 100.00 
P(Yk = 1|YF = 1, YL = 1) 100.00 100.00 7.83 
P(Yk = 1|YF = 1, YU = 1) 100.00 60.00 100.00 
P(Yk = 1|YL = 1, YU = 1) 56.25 100.00 100.00 
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     Yk is a binary variable that represents choosing an outlet with respect to choice k [k = farm 
gate (F), local markets (L) or urban markets (U)]. Each element in the binary triplet is a 
variable which is equal to one (100%) if there was a choice with respect to that type and zero 
otherwise. 
     The sample conditional probabilities in Table 4.9 provided fascinating indications of the 
existence of possible dependence between the three market outlets. Consider for example the 
case of “Urban Markets”. The unconditional probability of “Urban Markets” alone was 
11.48%. However, among all outlets with “Farm Gate”, the sample probability with “Urban 
Markets” was 8.43%; among all outlets with “Local Markets”, the probability was 9.14%. 
This meant that the probability of using only “Urban Market” was substantially reduced if 
there was additional information that another type of market package exists. Marketing 
information can lead to informed choice of markets with high level of returns. Information 
aids in acquainting the market participants with the marketing conditions of various outlet 
combinations. Better utilization of market information may in turn reduce marketing costs 
and make it more profitable to participate in the market. Jari (2009) stated that, availability of 
market information boosts confidence of households willing to participate in the market. Poor 
access to market information results in information-related problems, namely moral hazard 
and adverse selection, which in turn increases transaction costs discouraging market 
participation by some farmers (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005; Shiferaw et al., 2009). 
     The conditional and unconditional probabilities highlighted the existence of 
interdependence across the three outlets and have the following implications. About 72.95% 
of the observed sample used “Farm Gate”, 71.72% used “Local Markets” and 11.48% used 
“Urban markets” only. The conditional probability that a household used “Local Markets” 
decreased from 71.72% to 64.61% when farmers used a combination of market outlets as 
opposed to using an individual outlet of local markets. Similarly, the conditional probability 
that a household used only urban markets decreased from 11.48% to 8.43% when farmers 
used combinations of market outlets. These results indicated complementarity among the use 
of farm gate, local market and urban market outlets. This implied that the market outlets were 
interdependent of each other, meaning two or more individual market outlets improve on 
each other’s qualities (net returns). The farm gate, local market and urban market outlets 
exhibited a state of mutual dependence, interrelation and reciprocation where two or more of 
the market outlets supplemented each other. 
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     Table 4.10 provides a descriptive summary of the users of specific market outlets 
combinations and that of the pooled sample (Mean and Standard Deviation of All), with the 
base category of non-users of any channel combination also included. The table compared the 
means of explanatory variables between each market package and the baseline category 
(F0L0U0) under the assumption of unequal variance. SD is the standard deviation. Afterwards, 
the MNL model regression was conducted. All the proposed explanatory variables thought to 
influence the use of market packages were included in the analysis. The multinomial logit 
model regression was subsequently conducted to obtain parameter (coefficient) estimates and 
thereafter, the marginal effects of using specific combinations of market outlets were post 
estimated and the regression results are presented in Table 4.11.  
     The marginal effects from the MNL model, which measure the expected change in the 
probability of a particular choice being made with respect to a unit change in an independent 
variable, are reported and discussed. The marginal effects were used for interpretation since 
the coefficients had no direct interpretation. They were just values that maximized the 
likelihood function. The significant values showed whether a change in the independent 
variable significantly influences the logit at a given market package adoption strategy. 
     The MNL model fitted the data reasonably well. The Chi-square value of -243.085 
showed that the likelihood ratio statistics were highly significant (P < 0.000). The Wald test 
that all regression coefficients were jointly equal to zero was rejected [LR χ2 (112) = 176.08; 
Prob > χ2 = 0.000], suggesting that the MNL model had strong explanatory power. 
     Age of the household head had a negative and significant influence on using combinations 
F1L1U0 (farm gate and local market only), F1L0U1 (farm gate and urban market only) and 
F1L1U1 (farm gate, local market and urban market). This implied that, relative to the base 
category of non-use of any market package (F0L0U0), an increase in the farmer’s age by 1 
year decreased the probability of using F1L1U0, F1L0U1 and F1L1U1 by 0.51%, 0.09% and 
2.59e-06 respectively. This could be attributed to the possibility that older household heads 
had more children and dependents. It is likely that, for the packages that showed significance, 
the number of dependents was a pseudo characteristic of age. Age can be expected to have a 
negative association with market participation, as older household heads tend to have more 
dependents and hence engage more in subsistence production activities (Ehui et al., 2009). 
Alene et al. (2007), Barret et al. (2006) and Nwaru and Iwuji (2005) also gave evidence of 
declining market participation that comes with an increase in age of the farmers. 
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Table 4.10: Mean values for socioeconomic and institutional characteristics by market package used strategy. 
Variables 
Mean Values for Market Outlets Combinations (Packages) 
F0L0U0 F1L0U0 F0L1U0 F0L0U1 F1L1U0 F1L0U1 F0L1U1 F1L1U1 Mean of All SD of All 
Gender 0.60 0.57 0.74 0.67 0.78 0.50 1.00 0.89 0.72 0.45 
Age 52.50 49.84 44.61 39.83 47.86 45.33 51.00 44.00 47.51 10.88 
Education 7.50 8.91 9.45 10.17 10.31 10.17 10.00 9.33 9.65 3.95 
Household size 6.10 6.26 6.02 4.67 6.25 6.67 6.14 5.44 6.14 2.03 
Farm size 1.00 1.61 2.12 0.93 1.82 2.17 2.18 1.86 1.80 1.54 
Land ownership 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.00 0.32 0.33 0.71 0.44 0.32 0.47 
Group membership 0.80 0.93 0.89 0.83 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.91 0.29 
Extension visits 3.10 3.53 3.34 1.00 4.66 3.17 2.00 2.78 3.81 3.25 
Food sufficiency 0.10 0.16 0.25 0.33 0.21 0.50 0.71 0.33 0.23 0.42 
Distance 2.48 1.28 2.64 1.51 3.54 3.43 4.69 2.36 2.75 3.98 
Experience 8.40 5.71 4.62 4.33 10.69 6.33 8.86 5.78 7.76 7.47 
Contractual marketing 0.10 0.32 0.04 0.50 0.34 0.33 0.14 0.11 0.25 0.44 
Market information 0.10 0.40 0.26 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.71 0.56 0.53 0.50 
Transport 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.40 3.33 0.14 0.00 0.23 0.43 
Note: SD stands for standard deviation. 
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Table 4.11: Parameter and marginal effects estimates for the determinants of market packages used strategies by MNL. 
Variable 
            F1L0U0                  F0L1U0                   F0L0U1         F1L1U0 
Coeff (S.E) dy/dx Coeff (S.E) dy/dx Coeff (S.E) dy/dx Coeff (S.E) dy/dx 
Age -0.02 (0.03) -0.0060 -0.05 (0.03) -0.0000 -0.05 (0.05) -0.00002 -0.06 (0.03) -0.0051* 
Education 0.01 (0.11) 0.0006 -0.00 (0.11) -0.0011 0.06 (0.43) 0.00002 0.01 (0.11) 0.0017 
Household size -0.05 (0.22) -0.0031 -0.02 (0.23) -0.0072 -0.10 (1.34) -3.49e-06 -0.09 (0.22) -0.0137 
Experience -0.17 (0.07) -0.015** -0.20 (0.07) -0.0182*** 0.18 (0.13) 0.00018 -0.04 (0.06) -0.0336 
Gender -0.68 (0.89) -0.093 0.01 (0.91) 0.0374 0.04 (1.49) 0.0002 -0.09 (0.91) -0.0808 
Land ownership 0.77 (1.08) 0.023 0.71 (1.11) 0.0085 -19.57 (1644.41) -0.00001 0.61 (1.09) 0.0276 
Food sufficiency 1.16 (1.55) -0.143 2.98 (1.55) 0.1691* 3.65 (2.06) 0.0578 1.98 (1.52) 0.0963 
Group membership 1.96 (1.30) 0.124 1.74 (1.27) 0.0898 2.98 (1.96) 0.2121 0.73 (1.30) 0.2058 
Contract marketing 1.38 (1.78) 0.198 -2.60 (2.01) -0.3000 2.38 (3.20) 0.0282 0.54 (1.76) 0.0449 
Non-farm income 0.69 (1.00) 0.156 0.45 (1.02) 0.0919 -0.62 (1.22) -7.16e-06 -0.48 (1.02) -0.2215 
Transport -2.20 (1.62) -0.217 0.08 (1.56) 0.1067 -0.80 (1.68) -0.00002 -0.32 (1.52) -0.1097 
Access to credit -0.36 (0.95) -0.1.6 -1.49 (0.99) -0.3113 -1.84 (1.14)) -1.28e-06 1.00 (0.97) 0.4162 
Market information 3.39 (1.45) 0.058** 2.75 (1.47) 0.1580* -6.20 (3.12) -0.0002 4.23 (1.43) 0.2982*** 
Distance -0.26 (0.28) -0.082 0.10 (0.25) 0.0120 -2.20 (0.38) -0.00362 0.33 (0.24) 0.0931 
Farm size 1.05 (0.63) 0.002* 1.14 (0.63) 0.0162* 1.47 (0.55) 0.000032 1.03 (0.63) 0.0046* 
Extension visits 0.16 (0.22) 0.012 0.43 (0.23) 0.0339* -0.39 (0.15) -0.00022 0.20 (0.21) 0.0147 
Note: F0L0U0 is the reference base category in the MNL; ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
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Table 4.11: Parameter and marginal effects estimates for the determinants of market packages used strategies by MNL (Continuation). 
Variable 
                 F1L0U1                  F0L1U1                  F1L1U1 
Coeff (S.E) dy/dx Coeff (S.E) dy/dx Coeff (S.E) dy/dx 
Age -0.12 (0.06) -0.0009** -0.08 (0.05) -0.000 -0.10 (0.05) -2.59e-06* 
Education 0.01 (0.18) 0.0001 -0.36 (0.19) -0.0012* -0.17 (0.17) -9.83e-06 
Household size 0.21 (0.32) 0.0035 -0.32 (0.32) -0.001 -0.36 (0.32) -0.000 
Experience -0.12 (0.12) -0.0004 -0.15 (0.11) -0.0002 -0.07 (0.11) -9.38e-07 
Gender -1.79 (1.35) -0.0309 1.26 (1.55) 0.0039 3.25 (2.37) 0.000 
Land ownership 0.38 (1.49) 0.0033 1.90 (1.47) 0.0056 1.79 (1.43) 0.000 
Food sufficiency 4.15 (1.84) 0.0487** 0.54 (2.00) 0.0368*** 2.84 (1.75) 0.000 
Group membership 1.98 (2.41) 0.0085 1.64 (2.01) 0.0016 -0.12 (1.58) -0.000 
Contract marketing 2.87 (2.19) 0.0621 -0.06 (2.23) -0.0014 0.11 (2.15) 0.000 
Non-farm income -2.84 (1.95) -0.0362 1.94 (1.46) 0.0091 1.12 (1.26) 0.000 
Transport 0.46 (1.99) 0.0154 -0.47 (2.00) -0.0001 -25.73 (148650.6) -0.0206 
Access to credit 0.09 (1.42) 0.0017 1.84 (1.46) 0.0049 -0.04 (1.35) -0.00001 
Market information 2.79 (1.88) 0.0116 3.56 (1.74) 0.0005** 4.70 (1.69) 0.00005*** 
Distance 0.31 (0.28) 0.0017 0.51 (0.26) 0.0011** -0.03 (0.35) -0.000 
Farm size 0.90 (0.71) 0.0018 0.86 (0.72) 0.0006 1.32 (0.68) 0.00002* 
Extension visits 0.04 (0.32) 0.0024 -0.54 (0.45) -0.0026 0.24 (0.28) 1.03e-06 
Note: F0L0U0 is the reference base category in the MNL; ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
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     Education level of the household head was found to be negatively associated with using 
combination F0L1U1 (local market and urban market only). This meant that a 1 year increase 
in the education level of the household head reduced the likelihood of using F0L1U1 by 
0.12%, relative to F0L0U0 (non-use of any combination). This finding was interesting. Pegged 
on the ability to understand and interpret information related to improving market outlet 
choices hence income, education was expected to have a positive influence on using a market 
package. However, the justification behind this finding could be that; as smallholders became 
more advanced in terms of education they were better equipped with entrepreneurial skills 
that enabled them to make informed decisions that improved on marketing. It is therefore 
likely that the choice of F0L1U1 exhibited higher transaction costs, than the other packages 
which were found to be insignificant for this variable. Therefore educated farmers likely 
reduced engagements or even opted out of the outlets with higher transaction costs. Chirwa 
(2009) analyzed the determinants of marketing channels among smallholder maize farmers in 
Malawi and interestingly found that those who possessed a post primary qualification did not 
statistically influence the choice of a marketing channel. 
     The number of years smallholders had prior spent in marketing AILV was negatively 
associated with using F1L0U0 (farm gate only) and F0L1U0 (local market only). Therefore, an 
increase in smallholders’ marketing experience by a year resulted to a 1.5% and 1.8% drop in 
using F1L0U0 and F0L1U0 respectively, rather than not using any market combination at all 
(F0L0U0). It is likely that the more experienced farmers, based on the market signals picked 
up through years of experience, made informed decisions. It is also possible the farm gate and 
local market outlets did not offer as high a price the more experienced farmers anticipated, 
hence opted for other lucrative ventures at the expense of AILV. This contradicted Abay 
(2007) who found evidence that an increase in farmers’ experience caused an increase in 
tomatoes supplied to the market in Fogere, South Gonder. 
     Households’ food self-reliance in production positively influenced the likelihood of using 
F0L1U0 (local market only), F1L0U1 (farm gate and urban market only) and F0L1U1 (local 
market and urban market only). Households that were self-reliant in food production had 
higher probabilities of using F0L1U0, F1L0U1 and F1L0U1 (rather than not using any package), 
by 16.91%, 4.87% and 53.8% respectively. It is plausible that as households became more 
and more food secure, they were likely to use different market packages to sell excess surplus 
after meeting subsistence needs. Lukanu et al. (2004) postulated that households’ food 
availability, among others factors, determines farmers’ decision to commercially produce. 
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     Access to market information was positive and significant in using packages F1L0U0, 
F0L1U0 (local market only), F1L1U0 (farm gate and local market only), F0L1U1 (local and 
urban market only) and F1L1U1 (farm gate, local market and urban market). Relative to the 
base category of non-use of any market combination, households that had access to market 
information were more likely to use F1L0U0, F0L1U0, F1L1U0, F0L1U1 and F1L1U1 by 5.8%, 
15.8%, 29.82%, 0.05% and 0.005% respectively. For these market packages, access to market 
information indicated that farmers were informed on prevailing market condition. This could 
imply that farmers who used these market packages incurred neither higher transaction nor 
poor prices than those farmers who used F0L0U1 and F1L0U1 which were not found to be 
significant under the variable for access to market information. Jari (2009) stated that 
availability of market information boosted the confidence of households willing to participate 
in markets. Poor access to market information results in information-related problem, namely 
moral hazard and adverse selection which in turn increase transaction costs and hence 
discourages participation in the market by some farmers (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005; Shiferaw 
et al., 2009). 
     Distance from the farm to the market was an important factor influencing the use of 
F0L1U1 (local market and urban market only). This finding was alarming since it postulated 
that an increase in distance by 1 kilometer increased the probability of using F0L1U1 (local 
and urban market only) by 0.11%. It is punitive that this variable was only significant for 
F0L1U1 and insignificant for other packages due to the low transaction costs it offered. For 
example, minimal information related problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection 
could have reduced the cost of searching for information. Also, it is likely that F0L1U1 had 
higher gross margins resulting to its use. This contravened the finding by Voors and Haese 
(2010), that lesser distance to the major markets arguably reduce not only transport costs but 
also other transaction related costs: information gathering may be easier, negotiation more 
frequent, and monitoring less costly. 
     It was also found that farm size positively influenced the use of F1L0U0 (farm gate only), 
F0L1U0 (local market only), F1L1U0 (farm gate and local market only) and F1L1U1 (farm gate, 
local market and urban market only) This meant that an increase in land size by 1 acre 
(0.405ha) increased the probability of using F1L0U0, F0L1U0, F1L1U0, and F1L1U1 by 0.2%, 
1.62%, 0.46% and 0.002% respectively, as opposed to the base category of non-use of any 
market package. It is likely that households that possessed more land produced more AILV, 
thus had the higher likelihood of producing surpluses which were sold off to markets using 
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the significant packages. It is also likely that the use of a particular package may have been 
dependent on earlier choices, hence increase in farm sizes may not necessarily have 
influenced the choice of a package, but rather the quantity made available to the market 
through the consistent use of market packages. Farm size is a proxy to production scale. 
When the land size is large, the production scale is also large and vice versa. Large 
production scale positively influences the farmer to sell their produce at market place mainly 
because of economies of scale which lower transaction cost (Sigei et al., 2014). 
     Finally, the number of contacts with extension service providers positively influenced the 
use of F0L1U0. This meant that, rather than not using any market package (F0L0U0), an 
additional visit from extension workers increased the probability of participating through 
package F0L1U0 by 3.39%. Compared to other market packages, this variable was significant 
for F0L1U0 possibly because; extension information rooted for non-use of farm gates which 
are known to offer low prices as well as non-cash barter with neighbours as well as the risk of 
defaulting payment by neighbours. It could also be possible that extension workers 
discouraged the use of distant markets that increased costs, through transportation costs. 
Therefore, to get better prices than farm gates and to lower transaction costs to distant 
markets, the use of package F0L1U0 seemed viable. Mwaura et al. (2014) asserted that among 
other technical support services, extension services are necessary if gains at improving AILV 
gross margins for smallholders are to be realized 
4.2.3 Average adoption treatment effects for the market packages 
     Treatment characteristics are actual net revenues from using a package (Equation 25), 
while untreated characteristics are counterfactual net revenues if farm households did not use 
a particular channel (Equation 26). The impact/treatment effect is the difference between the 
treated and untreated characteristics (Equation 27). An endogenous switching regression was 
conducted to estimate the actual and counterfactual scenarios for using the 7 market outlets 
combinations. The results are presented in Table 4.12. In interpretation, a standard approach 
could be applied to identify the best combination of market outlets with the highest pay offs. 
Here, a comparison of actual mean net revenues by farm households’ package use strategy 
could be done. 
     However, based on the ESR results, this naïve comparison would drive to the possible 
conclusion that farm households that used F0L1U1 and F1L0U1 outlets were those that earned 
the most. However, this was not the case. This approach can be misleading, and should be 
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avoided in evaluating the impact of using market packages on net revenues as it assumes that 
using an outlet is exogenously determined, while it is potentially an endogenous variable. 
This problem is addressed by estimating counterfactual net revenues, that is, what farm 
households would have earned if they had not used a particular market package. Table 4.12 
presents net revenues under actual and counterfactual conditions. The expected net revenues 
under the actual case that the farm household used a particular market combination, and the 
counterfactual case that it did not are compared. The last column of Table 4.12 presents the 
impact of each outlet on net revenues, which is the treatment effect, calculated as the 
difference between columns 2 and 3 (Equation 27). 
Table 4.12: Impact of use and non-use of market packages on incomes by ESR. 
Package 
Treated 
Characteristics 
Untreated 
Characteristics 
Impact/Treatment 
Effects 
F1L0U0 15390.15 (1655.64) 16966.19 (894.08) -1575.85 
F0L1U0 15865.77 (1662.35) 16809.42 (892.74) -943.65 
F0L0U1 37718.50 (5376.49) 16127.30 (784.64) 21591.2 
F1L1U0 16598.77 (1172.28) 16622.36 (1058.50) -23.59 
F1L0U1 21643.96 (7241.02) 16517.70 (789.97) 5126.26 
F0L1U1 22132.94 (5567.16) 16456.07 (793.20) 5676.87 
F1L1U1 17948.12 (4385.11) 16628.02 (802.08) 1320.10 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
     Unless urban market outlets are individually used, using market outlets in isolation 
generally led to lower incomes for packages with farm gates and rural markets present. Urban 
markets offered better prices, thus farmers were more likely to earn better income. Also, the 
use of market combinations of farm gates and local markets (F1L1U0) led to lower incomes 
due to the monetary and non-monetary transactions associated with the package in remote 
villages. All outlet combinations with urban markets present in the package projected a 
positive increase in income from using the combination, with the highest return of Ksh. 
5,676.87 exhibited by F0L1U1; followed by F1L0U1 at Ksh. 5,126.26; and F1L1U1 at Ksh. 
1,320.10. Alternative to using urban market outlets in isolation, farmers should therefore seek 
combinations which have urban markets present so as to earn better incomes. 
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4.3 Gross margin analysis of individual AILV market outlets 
     The gross margin is defined as gross income net off direct total variable cost. Variable 
costs are those costs in production, which are specific to the enterprise and vary in proportion 
to the size of the enterprise. A gross margin usually indicates the income farmers have left for 
fixed costs and profits. It is formulated as; 
GM = TR – TVC 
Where; 
GM = Gross Margin; 
TR = Total Revenue; 
TVC = Total Variable Costs. 
     The gross margin analysis results as summarized by Table 4.13, show positive orientation. 
This does not negate the fact that the some individual households had negative gross margins. 
Table 4.13: Gross margin analysis of individual market outlets without combinations. 
Item Farm Gate Local Market Urban Market 
Average bags of AILV sold 20.74 18.10 33.71 
Average price of AILV per bag 35.00 50.00 75.00 
A. Total revenue 725.97 905.01 2528.45 
Transportation costs 0.00 50.00 150.00 
Storage costs 15.00 20.00 70.00 
Sorting costs 20.00 30.00 100.00 
Packaging costs 20.00 30.00 180.00 
Search for market information 20.00 50.00 250.00 
Value of losses 50.00 80.00 300.00 
B. Total variable costs 125.00 260.00 1050.00 
C. Gross margin (A–B) 600.97 645.01 1478.45 
D. Marketing cost as a percentage of 
gross margin (B/C)% 
20.80 40.31 71.02 
E. Net marketing margin (C–B) 475.97 385.01 428.45 
F. Marketing efficiency 
(E/B*100)% 
380.78 148.08 40.80 
Note: 1 bag of AILV is equal to 30 kilograms. 
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     Results showed that farm gates received the lowest gross margin of Ksh. 600.97 while the 
urban markets received the highest of Ksh. 1,478.45. The local markets received Ksh. 645.01. 
The low gross margins earned by farmers could have been caused by lack of extension 
services, relatively low prices and poor access to market information especially on demand 
and prices. Further, the gross margin for farm gate and local markets were relatively close 
(more or less equal). It was possible that farmers hired labour and/or equipment to transport 
AILV to local markets thus incurring costs, reducing their gross margins; however farmers 
trading at farm gates did not have to incur such transportation costs. It is also possible that the 
presence of brokers and village traders across the outlets resulted to overfilling bags with 
AILV, thus contributing to the reduction of the gross margins for the farmers. It seemed that 
farmers who used urban market outlets received the biggest share of gross margins were well 
informed about market prices and trends than farmers who opted for the farm gate and local 
market outlets. 
     Marketing of AILV was generally profitable, as the analysis in the table shows that 
20.80%, 40.31% and 71.02% of the gross marketing margin was spent on marketing cost (for 
farm gate, local markets and urban markets respectively), with the remaining amount retained 
as net marketing margin. The implications for this finding is that, while urban markets have 
higher margins, they are costlier to use than the farm gate and local market outlets. It may 
also be evident that marketing activities of the users of farm gates and local markets were 
performed efficiently, with efficiency ratios far in excess of 100%. However, it can be 
inferred that net marketing margins are not equitably distributed across the market outlets. 
Constraints such as limited access to credit, high cost of transportation, bad nature of roads 
linking marketing centers to producing centers and inadequate storage facilities could have 
therefore impeded the optimal performance of the AILV marketing system. 
     Investigating the determinants of market outlet choices for mango producers in Costa 
Rica, Zuniga-Aria and Ruben (2007) showed the significance of four major factors in their 
analytical framework. The first was related to the farm household characteristics, including 
farmer’s experience, outlet profitability and attitude toward risk. The second factor dealt with 
production systems such as farm size and the production scale. The third dealt with price 
attributes; and the last was related to the market context, that is, having or not a written 
contract, geographical location and distance to urban markets. These factors could potentially 
have explained the amount of the gross margins for the three individual market outlets. This 
study however did not seek to quantify the determinants of gross margins for AILV farmers. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
     Alongside characterizing smallholder AILV farmers according to their socioeconomic and 
institutional attributes, this study examined the factors that influenced smallholders’ 
participation in markets as net sellers, net buyers or autarkic. It further sought to establish the 
combination of market outlets that offered higher income margins to farmers. Results showed 
the importance of marketing experience, land ownership, households’ food self-sufficiency, 
contractual marketing, access to credit and extension services in influencing the regimes in 
which small holders participate in markets. It was also evident that smallholders sold their 
produce mainly at the farm gate (on farm) and in rural markets packages. The market 
packages that contained the farm gate and local market options were majorly preferred. A 
small proportion of farmers sold AILV to the more lucrative (but distant) off farm urban 
markets. Here market packages containing urban market outlets did not perform well in terms 
of use by smallholders. These farmers do not participate effectively in the off farm urban 
markets that offer excellent opportunities for increasing their farm incomes which could haul 
them out of the poverty trap in which they currently languish.  
5.2 Recommendations and policy implications 
     This study demonstrated the relevance of survey methods in enhancing farmers’ 
involvement in policy making. Besides being influenced by various factors of market 
participation, the relative proportions of output sold through various outlet combinations 
could indicate the demand patterns for AILV in rural and urban settings which farmers could 
exploit, so as to gain higher incomes. High transportation costs hinder farmers from 
transporting produce to distant urban markets which offer better prices for AILV. To ease 
movement of AILV and reduce the transportation costs, it is thus necessary to upgrade farm-
to-market roads and establish more and better equipped retail market centers in villages, so as 
to reduce transport costs and encourage rural farmers to produce and trade in the high-value 
AILV. Policies that reduce transportation costs, through improved transportation, would 
increase output by both increasing market participation and increasing production, for market 
participants. In addition, improving rural infrastructure (rural access/feeder roads) would 
facilitate faster delivery of farm produce (especially perishable commodities such as AILV) 
to urban consumers at low transportation costs. These interventions that improve market 
participation as well as quantities transacted would encourage net sales of AILV. 
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     The private sector role in marketing AILV and involvement in the AILV value chain, 
cannot be overemphasized. Promoting the formation of rural information bureaus that are 
specifically tailored to deal with AILV is critical. These institutions could enhance farmers’ 
supply response to market dynamics for households in various socioeconomic profiles and 
village categories. This is a critical step in generating more marketable surplus by facilitating 
private sector provision of market information via improved information systems. The 
transaction costs of market participation and quantity of output sold could thus be reduced 
through improved information and transportation infrastructure, deeper infiltration of 
trustworthy input merchants, and promotion of institutional innovations, such as AILV 
production and marketing cooperatives. 
     Simultaneous improvements in market integration (through institutional reforms) and 
market access (by building sustainable and predictable linkages to urban markets) in addition 
to improving infrastructure is critically important. Energies towards this end would entail 
embracing group marketing arrangements to bring down transaction costs (such as 
transportation costs, costs of searching for market information) and bargain for better AILV 
prices. To improve the pricing system of AILV, farmers should form production clusters, 
through formation of producer groups or cooperatives, in order to improve on their market 
intelligence and promote organization in marketing. The most common market options for 
majority of farmers were the farm gate and local village markets, because of their close 
proximity, making farmers incur lower transportation costs. Accordingly, the prices and 
incomes derived from these markets are low because of excess supply. Agriculture extension 
systems should be AILV crop-specific, market driven, decentralized and farmer-led in order 
to improve productivity and profitability. The development of innovative extension systems 
by the government is therefore needed. While indeed extension services are present, the 
nature of information disseminated by officers should not focus on the traditional cash and 
food crops such as maize and beans. AILV, which have gained attention contemporarily, 
should be incorporated into the extension services offered by government workers. 
5.3 Further research 
    Although transaction costs are difficult to measure, understanding the impact they have on 
smallholders’ marketing behaviour is crucial, as they can inform policy design aimed at 
reducing them, thus promote profitability of AILV. This study therefore recommends that 
further research should be explored on how different types of transaction costs influence 
marketing decisions and outcomes for AILV producing farm households. 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
ANALYSIS OF SMALLHOLDER MARKETING BEHAVIOUR OF AFRICAN 
INDIGENOUS LEAFY VEGETABLES IN NYAMIRA COUNTY 
Questionnaire Code: ________________________________ Ward: ____________________ 
1. Gender of the household head (1=Male; 0=Female): Sexhh _________________________ 
2. Age of the household head (in years): Agehh ____________________________________ 
3. Education level of the household head (in years of schooling): Edcnhh _______________ 
4. Education level of the spouse (in years of schooling): Edcnspz ______________________ 
5. Total number of household members: Hhsze ____________________________________ 
6. The number of dependents below 18 years and above 60 years of working age: Dpndnt __ 
7. Is your family labour adequate for farm activities? (1=Yes; 0=No): Labadq ____________ 
8. Total land holding size (in acres): Famsyz ______________________________________ 
9. Security of tenure (1=Title deed owned; 0=No title deed): Secten ____________________ 
10. Do you own any livestock? (1=Yes; 0=No): Lvstck ______________________________ 
11. What is the average value of the total livestock owned? Valstck ____________________ 
12. Do you belong to any groups/cooperative? (1=Yes; 0=No): Group __________________ 
13. What is the nature of the group? (1=Formal; 0=Informal): Ntrgrp __________________ 
14. What service(s) do you receive from the group? (0=Savings; 1=Credit; 2=Marketing; 
3=Training; 4=Others, specify): Grpsvc _______________ ___________________________ 
15. Do you have access to credit/loan? (1=Yes; 0=No): Credit ________________________ 
16. How much worth of credit did you receive in the survey period? Crdtwrth ___________ 
17. What was the value of on-farm income in the survey period? Valon _________________ 
18. Do you participate in non-farm income generating activities? (1=Yes; 0=No): Nonfrm __ 
19. What was the value of non-farm income in the survey period? Valoff ________________
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20. Information on AILV. 
AILV 
Name 
Name 
Area 
Cultivated 
in Acres 
Acres 
Quantity 
Produced 
Quantprod 
Cost of 
Producing 
in Ksh. 
Prodcost 
Quantity 
Consumed 
Quantcons 
Quantity 
Quantsold 
Average 
Price in 
Ksh 
Avprcsold 
Quantity 
Quantbot 
Average 
Price in 
Ksh 
Avprcbot 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
1=Chinsaga/ Sageti (Spider plant); 2=Rinagu (African Nighshde); 3=Egesare (Cowpeas); 4=Emboga (Vegetables Amaranths); 5=Omotere (Jute 
Mallow); 6=Enderema (Vine spinach); 7=Mitoo (Slender leaf); 8=Amato’ Omuongo (Pumpkin leaves);  
9=Others Specify______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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21. Number of times of receipt of extension services: Frqextn ________________________ 
22. Do you produce sufficient food for the family for the whole year? (1=Yes; 0=No): 
Food______________________________________________________________________ 
23 Information on distance: 
Description of Distance Kilometres Condition of the road  (1=Good; 0=Bad) 
Cndtn 
Home to the farm (Hmfrm)   
Farm to nearest market (Frmrkt)   
Home to nearest market (Hmrkt)   
Home to nearest town (Hmtwn)   
Farm to nearest town (Fmtwn)   
24. For how many years have you been selling AILV? Exper _________________________ 
25. Was there any marketing failure in any of these years? Mktfail (1=Yes; 0=No): _______ 
26. If yes, what are the sources of such failures? Srcfail (0=Postharvest losses; 1=Poor roads 
connecting markets; 2=Unfavourable production conditions (drought, pests and diseases) 
causing low production for the market; 3=Enough for subsistence consumption only; 4=Low 
prices; 5=Others, specify): _____________________________________________________ 
27. If you transport your produce, do you know the nearby town market price from the local 
market price before transporting your AILV to the nearby town market? (1=Yes, 0=No): 
Twnpryc __________________________________________________________________ 
28. Do you know about other prices available before you sell your AILV? (1=Yes; 0=No): 
Othrpryc __________________________________________________________________ 
29. How and where did you sell your AILV produce? 
 (0=Directly to the purchaser/traders; 1=Through 
brokers; 2=Institutions/Groups/Cooperatives; 
3=Neighbours; 4=Others, specify). Outlet 
Location of transaction (0= Farm 
gate; 1=Local rural market; 
2=Urban market).  Where 
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30. Is there any problem created by any marketing channel? (1=Yes; 0=No): Chnlprb _____ 
31. What are the problems if any? (1=Weight/scale cheating; 2=Limiting by client; 3=Charge 
high brokers price; 4=Credit defaulting; 5=Inaccessibility of market; 6=Low price offer; 
7=Lack of price information; 8=Others, specify): ___________________________________ 
What channel do you use to sell 
AILV 
 
1=Direct 
2=Brokers 
3=Cooperatives/Institutions/Groups 
4=Neighbours 
5=Others, specify 
 
Channel 
 
Confidence 
in channel  
 
1=Yes 
0=No   
 
Cnfdnc 
What 
is/are the 
problem(s) 
 
 
Use codes 
in 31 above 
 
Watprblm 
Who sets your 
selling price?  
 
1=Yourself; 
2=Market; 
3=Buyers; 
4=Negotiations; 
5=Other, specify 
 
Prcsetn 
Do you 
have any 
contracts 
with this 
channel? 
 
1=Yes 
0=No 
 
 
Cntrct 
Direct     
Brokers     
Cooperatives/Institutions/Groups     
Neighbours     
Others, specify     
 
32. Do you have access to market information? (1=Yes; 0=No): Mrktinfo _______________ 
If yes, from where did you get the market 
information? (1=Local traders; 
2=Neighbours; 3=Cooperatives/Groups; 
4=Media; 5=Extension officers; 6=Others, 
specify). 
Srcinfo 
What information did you receive? (1=Price; 
2=AILV market location; 3=Time of year to 
sell; 4=Marketing channel options; 5=Post-
harvest handling and value addition; 
6=others specify).   
Watinfo 
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33. Do own any transport equipment? Trans (1=Yes; 0=No): _________________________ 
34. If yes, which equipment do you own? Transeq (0=Animal carts; 1=Vehicle; 2=Bicycle; 
3=Wheelbarrow; 4=Others, specify): _____________________________________________ 
35. How do you transport your AILV produce to the market places? Transmean (0=N/A; 
1=Walking/Carrying; 2=Hired labourer to carry; 3= Public service vehicle/Hired equipment; 
4=Own transport vehicle/equipment; 5=Group transportation; 6=Others, specify): 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
36. What are the major costs you incur in selling your AILV? (0=N/A; 1=Transportation cost 
(Transcst); 2=Packaging cost (Pckgcst); 3=Storage/preservation cost (Stocst); 4=Sorting 
cost (Sortcst); 5=Search for market information cost (Schinfo); 6=Others, specify): 
Cost (Use codes above). Value of Cost. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
37. Do you make decision to sell before planting AILV? (1=Yes; 0=No): Dcsn ___________ 
38. Did you consider prices offered when you decided to produce AILV? (1=Yes; 0=No): 
Prycoffr____________________________________________________________________ 
39. Do you think AILV, as a farm enterprise, is profitable? (1=Yes; 0=No): Prcptn ________ 
40. Decision making: 
Who makes decision on…? 0=Relative; 1=Farm worker; 
2=Children; 3=Spouse; 
4=Household head. 
Gender of decision 
maker 
1=Male; 0=Female. 
1.Production of AILV (Dcsnprdc)   
2.Sale of the AILV (Dcsnsale)   
3.Use of money from sales (Dscnuse)   
 
